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ERISA, PREEMPTION AND 
COMPREHENSIVE FEDERAL HEALTH 
CARE: A CALL FOR "COOPERATIVE 
FEDERALISM" TO PRESERVE 
THE STATES' ROLE IN FORMULATING 
HEALTH CARE POLICY 
JAMES E. HOLLOWAY* 
With the dominance of federal medical care and the exclusiv-
ity of federal employee benefit regulation, the passage of compre-
hensive federal health care regulation, which establishes uniform 
and consistent administration of medical care, significantly 
threatens to interfere with state powers to develop innovative 
health care and to promote their public policy. This interference, 
in turn, would signal the decline of American federalism. Many 
commentators and government officials believe that a comprehen-
sive federal health care policy will reform the nation's health care 
delivery system.1 Although such reform is likely, its preemptive 
effects could be constitutionally damaging for two predominant 
reasons. First, the federal government must retain and exercise 
final regulatory authority over much state health care and other 
policy to establish uniform and consistent regulation of medical 
care. Second, the federal government already retains and exer-
* James E. Holloway, Associate Professor, Business Law, Department of 
Finance, School of Business, El;lst Carolina University, Greenville, North 
Carolina 27858; B.S., North Carolina A & T State University, 1972; M.B.A., East 
Carolina University, 1984; J.D., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 
1983. 
1. Mary Anne Boblinski, Unhealthy Federalism: Barriers to Increasing 
Health Care Access for the Uninsured, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 255 (1990); J. 
Geisel, Delays, Politics May Hobble Health Reform, Bus. INS., May 10, 1993, at 
57; J.B. Kenny & Sean Sullivan, Health Care Reform: National, State and Local 
Direction, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS J., June 1993, at 41. 
Many causes have been put forth to explain the crisis of the national health 
care delivery system. See Christine Woolsey, Doctol' the Patient Is Critical, Bus. 
INS., Oct. 30, 1992, at 20. Woolsey finds that the health care crisis was caused by 
several factors: the aging of the population, medical technology, poverty, medical 
malpractice, the capitalistic health care system, AIDS, and government 
intervention. Id. at 20-22. In addition, Woolsey finds that doctors, hospitals, 
lawyers, and insurance companies must bear much of the blame. Id. at 23-25. 
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cises final authority under employee benefit policy which pres-
ently preempts much state health care policy. In maintaining a 
consistent and uniform statutory framework which provides 
access to, compensates for, and insures the quality of health care, 
a comprehensive federal health care regulation could eventually 
preempt much state law and public policy (i.e., state health care, 
health care-related, tort, insurance, employment, and contract 
laws).2 Therefore, national health care regulation could preempt 
more state law and public policy than regulations addressing 
employee benefit policy, which continue to decrease the scope of 
federalism. 3 
This article revisits the familiar theme of federalism and 
health care policy. It takes the position that federalism is decreas-
ing and will decrease further under national health care that is 
fast becoming, if not already so, an exclusive field of federal regu-
lation.4 The article draws this conclusion from three influences on 
federal regulation and policy: (1) the expanding preemptive 
effects of employee benefit regulation on state health care, as well 
as other law and public policy; (2) the increasing public policy 
favoring a comprehensive national health care policy; and (3) the 
existing dominance of federal medical care and assistance regula-
tion in the field of health care. The article is a comment on the 
preemptive effect that federal employee benefit regulation pres-
2. See Rick Wartzman & Hillary Stout, Clinton Health Plan Push 
Competition to be Ready to Regulate: Comprehensive Care Scheme Will Set 
Terms of a Battle Not Soon to Be Resolved-Strong Arm of Government , WALL 
ST. J., Sept. 13, 1993, at Al (stating that Clinton's comprehensive proposal 
extends the power of government and permits it to reach in some narrow places). 
For discussion of the expansive preemptive effects of a comprehensive federal 
health care policy on state law, see generally infra notes 203-14 and 
accompanying text (listing potential state fields of law and public policy that 
would be preempted, in whole or part, by a comprehensive health care policy). 
3. Mark A. Hofmann & Meg Fletcher, Reform Plan Takes Shape, Bus. INS., 
May 17, 1993, at 1 ("including medical elements of workers comp, auto cover in 
system raises concerns"); Meg Fletcher, Work Compo Insurers Oppose Removing 
Medical Care From State System, Bus. INS., May 17, 1993, at 24; see also Geisel, 
supra note 1, at 1. 
4. This article does not challenge the importance of national health care'. It 
seeks to heighten the debate regarding the constitutional dangers of a 
comprehensive federal health care policy. It observes that such a policy's effect 
on state law and public policy could eventually be broader than anticipated and 
thus threaten federalism. 
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ently has on state health care law and public policy.5 In addition, 
5. One example of a comprehensive federal health care plan is the proposal 
offered by the current Feder,aIAdministration. AMERICAN HEALTH SECURITY ACT 
OF 1993, H.R. 1200, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1993). It is used as an example in this 
artiCle to illustrate how comprehensive federal health care policy could 
eventually affect state-federal relations a:nd thus undermine federalism through 
lessening states' powers. Most likely, other comprehensive policies will have 
similar advantages and disadvantages to the current Federal Administration's 
proposal. There are enough plans, with more to come, such as THE HEALTH 
SECURITY ACT, H.R. 3600, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1993) (the Clinton Plim); HEALTH 
EQUITY AND ACCESS' REFORM TODAY ACT, H.R. 3652, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1993) 
(the Chafee-Dole plan); AMERICAN HEALTH SECURITY ACT, H.R. 1200, 103d Cong., 
2d Sess. (1993) (the Wellstone-McDermott plan); and AFFORDABLE HEALTH CARE 
Now ACT, H.R. 3080, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1993) (the Hous.e Republican 
Approach). See gener:allyJohn Harwood, Rival,Plans Gain Strength But None 
Claim Majority , WALL ST. J ., Oct. 28, 1993, at A18. One thing is definite-
e~eryone seems to have a plan, but no one seems to have a solution. Thus, this 
article will use the current Federal Administration's plan to illustrate both 
immediate and long-term constitutional concerns regarding the impact of 
comprehensive federal health care regulation. on federalism and states' rights. 
In September 1993, the current Federal Administration released its 
proposed n~tional health care reform. ,The reform proposal is called The 
American Health Security Act (hereinafter Health Security Proposal). See The 
White House Domestic P~lic'y Council, THE CLINTON BLUEPRINT: THE 
PRESIDENT'S HEALTH SECURITY PLAN 3, 1993 (Introduction by Erik Eckholm of 
The New York Times) (hereinafter President's Health Plan). The Health 
Security Proposal offers health care coverage to each American, by providing a 
comprehensive package of health care benefits. These benefits are purchased by 
regional health alliances that are operated by the states. These alliances 
purchase health benefits from local health plans within the states. Id. at x. The 
"Comprehensive Benefits [are defined as] [g]uaranteed benefits [that] should 
meet the full range of health ' needs, including primary, preventive and 
specialized care. Id. at ii. 
It has been noted that the "[current Federal Administration's] proposal gives 
states considerable flexibility but envisions the federal government in a strong 
'supervisory role." Edwin Chen & Robert A. Rosenblatt, Health Plan Casts Wide 
Net , THE NEWS AND OBSERVER, Sept. 11, 1993, at 1A (Authors are reporters for 
Los Angeles Times.). Under the Health Security Proposal, the federal 
government ·,establishes minimum standards, while the states can implement 
their own plans. If, however, the states fail to implement a plan, the federal 
government will do .so. The Health Security PI'oposal imposes an health care tax 
on employers ' which makes health care benefits a mandatory employer 
obligation. Furthermore, under the Health Security Proposal, individuals must 
pay a portion oftheir health care cost. For those individuals that cannot afford to 
pay f~r their health care, the Health Security Proposal provide~ for a government 
subsidy. The Health Security Proposal also requires individuals and some 
employers ' to enroll in state regulated health care plans through regional or 
corporate alliances. President's Health Plan, supra, at xi-xvi. 
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the article discusses the preemptive effect that comprehensive fed-
eral health care could eventually have on state law, public policy, 
and health care regulations. 
The article begins by examining government obligations for, 
and federal regulation of, health care under the United States 
Constitution. It discusses federal medical assistance and 
employee benefit policies as well as state health care law and pub-
lic policy. Part II examines the extent to which employee benefit 
regulation preempts state common law, insurance regulation, and 
other law. In addition, Part II discusses the exceptions to and 
exemptions from preemption under employee benefit regulation. 
Part III examines the preemption of specific state health care reg-
ulation by federal employee benefit regulation. Specifically, it 
analyzes federal court cases which addressed the issue of whether 
federal employee benefit regulation preempts state health care 
law. Part IV, using employee benefit regulation as an example of 
a comprehensive regulatory model, discusses the scope of federal-
ism under employee benefit and proposed national health care pol-
icies. Part V discusses the expansive preemption of state law 
needed to establish uniform and consistent regulation of the 
administration of health care. In addition, it comments on the 
shared health care responsibilities of the state and federal govern-
ments under federalism. The article concludes by finding that the 
dominance of the federal regulation in the field of medical care, 
coupled with the expansive preemptive effects of both national 
health care and employee benefit policy, severely limit the states' 
powers to establish comprehensive health care policy. Such limi-
tations accelerate the decline of federalism by restricting the 
states' ability to concern themselves with local medical care needs 
and to use local employment-based resources in formulating a 
comprehensive state health care policy. 
On October 27, 1993, the current Federal Administration presented to 
Congress the Health Security Act (hereinafter Presented Health Security Act). 
Commerce Clearinghouse, President Clinton's Health Care Reforms Proposal: 
Health Security Act as Presented to Congress on October 27, 1993, CCH 
Professional Summary and Text of Bill) (1993) (hereinafter Clinton's Health 
Care Reform). The Presented Health Security Act contains 11 titles that 
introduce and implement health care reform. "In addition, the White House has 
indicated that numerous technical con-ections to this version of the legislation 
will be added when the bill is actually introduced." Id. at 3. 
A. 
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I. HEALTH CARE: THE GOVERNMENT'S OBLIGATION 
AND POLICY 
-, 
409 
During the last thirty years, the federal government has 
enacted two major medical assistance programs and reluctantly 
pursued national health 'care ' programs.6 On the other hand, 
states have enacted health care legislation to increase access to, 
control the cost of, and pay for medical care and services. 7 At the 
same time, federal courts were finding that much state health 
care policy was preempted by federal employee benefit policies.8 
The expansive preemption of state health care law by employee 
benefit policy, along with a lack of proposals for permitting states 
to develop their health care reform, suggests an eventual constitu-
tional conflict regarding limitations on the exercise of powers by 
states under a comprehensive federal health care regulation. 
Such a conflict would signal a further decline in the scope of feder-
alism. Federalism declines when states are not permitted to make 
comprehensive state health care policy that: (1) freely uses fed-
eral resources; (2) broadly relies upon private sources of revenues; 
(3) directly mandates employment-based obligations; and (4) truly 
reflects state and local public policy. 
A. The Influence of Federal Health Care Policy 
Federal employee benefit regulation and federal medical care 
regulation significantly __ influence existing state law and public 
policy. Federal medical care regulation permits the federal gov-
ernment to dominate the field of health care. Currently, federal 
medical care regulation consists mostly of social insurance and 
means-tested medical care arid assistance programs. Federal reg-
ulation provides medical insurance to aged and disabled citizens 
and subsidizes medical assistance to indigent children and their 
families. 9 Federal medical care regulation also permits limited 
state participation in health care administration and asks states 
6. See Boblinski, supra note 1, at 340. 
7. Michael S. Ackerman, ERISA: Preemption of State Health Care Law and 
Worker Well-Being, 1981 U. ILL. L. REV. 825 (1981); Boblinski, supra note 1, at 
299-305; M.K. Keefe, Three States Focus on Reform at Home, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT 
PLAN REV., July 1993, at 38, 38-43; Bill Would Authorize Implementation of 
Health Care Reform At The State Level, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLAN REV., Nov. 
1992, at 52, 53 (hereafter Authorize Implementation); see also infra notes 179-
180 and accompanying text. 
8. Infra notes 9-16 and accompanying text. 
9. Infra notes 24-31 and accompanying text. 
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to establish health assistance programs in order to gain federal 
funds. Nevertheless, federal health care regulation is a patch-
work of annual legislative amendments, lately affected by federa,l 
budget deficit reduction. 
Employee health care benefits plans are regulated by federal 
employee benefit regulation, which is known as the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 197410 (hereinafter ERISA). 
ERISA regulates, inter alia, the administration of employee 
health care benefitsll and provides a regulatory framework for the 
adminisration of employee benefit plans among the states.12 The 
uniformity and consistency created by this framework justifies, as 
recognized by Congress and the Supreme Court, the invalidation 
of much state law and public policy.13 For those reasons, state 
officials, commentators, and scholars argue that ERISA goes too 
far.14 Specifically, they argue that the broad interpretation of 
ERISA's preemption clause, as contained in section 1144(a),15 pre-
vents states from exercising their police and other powers to 
establish a comprehensive state health care policy.16 Although 
such an interpretation greatly decreases states' legislative means 
to increase access to or pay for health care needs, federal courts 
have consistently concluded that much state health care and 
health care-related regulations "relate to"17 ERISA-covered 
10. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). 
11. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). 
12. See infra notes 48-62 ~hd accompanying text. 
13. See infra notes 86-98 and accompanying text. 
14. See, e.g., Hearing on H.R. 1602 and H.R. 2782: Bills Relating to ERISA's 
Preemption of Certain State Laws, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess., (1991) (hearing before 
the Subcommittee on Labor-Management Relations of the Committee on 
Education and Labor House of Representative); Ackerman, supra note 7, at 864-
67; Boblinski, supra note 1, at 258-59; Laura J. Bond, Note, ERISA-Preemption: 
Congress's Cue to Reassess ERISA's Preemption Effect, 36 RAN. L. REV. 611, 611-
25 (1988); Junda Woo, Benefits Law Hurts Some It Aimed to Help, WALL ST. J., 
Mar. 4, 1993, at B1; Authorize Implementation, supra note 7, at 52-53 (Senate 
Bill 1380 to amend ERISA). 
Id. 
15. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988). This section provides: 
(a) Supersedure; effective date. Except as provided in subsection (b) 
of this section, the provisions of this title and title IV shall supersede 
any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to 
any employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this title and 
not exempt under 1003(b). This section shall take effect on January 1, 
1975. 
16. See supra note 14; see also infra notes 99-177 and accompanying text. 
17. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988). 
1994 
empl 
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employee benefit plans. As a result, these state health care laws 
interfere with the consistent and uniform regulation of the admin-
istration of employee benefit plans as intended by Congress. 18 
Thus, both the required compliance with federal subsidized medi-
cal assistance regulation and the broad preemptive effects of 
employee benefit regulation severely limit the content and 
enforceability of state health care policy. 
B. The Federal and State Health Care Obligation 
In examining the preemption of state health care policy and 
its impact on federalism, a critical question is whether the govern-
ment has an enforceable obligation to provide and secure health 
care. If government has no obligation to secure health care, then 
governmental health care programs provide temporary benefits 
which may not be a legitimate state concern. But if a governmen-
tal obligation does exist, the issue becomes whether the state or 
federal government is responsible for that obligation under feder-
alism's sharing of power. Thus, in analyzing the preemptive 
effects that employee benefit and national health care policies 
have on state law and public policy, two fundamental points need 
to be considered. First, whether government has an obligation to 
provide and secure health care for its citizens. And second, if gov-
ernment has this obligation, which government(s) in our federalist 
system should have an "affirmative obligation" to provide and 
secure health care for its citizens? Presently, the federal govern-
ment provides health care insurance to the aged and disabled, 
while state governments implement health care programs and 
provide federally subsidized medical assistance to the needy.19 
1. Government Responsibility for Medical Care 
The former question, whether government has the duty to 
provide and secure health care, requires consideration first 
because if government has no health care responsibility then fed-
eral and state health care programs are not interminable obliga-
tions. While there has been much discussion about whether 
government has a public obligation, there is no agreement. 
Although few states have recognized an individual's right to medi-
cal care, most have voluntarily established medical care assist-
18. See infra notes 63-69 and accompanying text. 
19. See infra notes 24-31 and accompanying text. 
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ance programs for parts of the general population.20 However, 
federal courts have generally held that individuals do not have a 
constitutional right to receive federal or state medical care.21 In 
Health Care and the Constitution: Public Health and the Role of 
the State in the Framing ERA, 22 Professor Parmet discussed pub-
lic health law and political theories and concluded that govern-
ment has an obligation to provide health care to its citizens.23 
Furthermore, Professor Parmet found that the Framers could 
have intended health care to be a state obligation, as opposed to 
federal. It is beyond the scope of this article to articulate a ration-
ale for or against government responsibility for providing health 
care to its citizens. At this time, the federal and state govern-
ments are performing a health care role and seem unlikely to give 
it up or to expand it rapidly. 
20. See Boblinski, supra note 1, at 306 n.174. Many states have established 
statutory and constitutional provisions that provide medical assistance to the 
poor. Michael A. Dowell, State and Local Government Legal Responsibilities to 
Provide Medical Care for the Poor, 3 J.L. & HEALTH 1, 3-7 (1988-89). Moreover, 
several states have begun to establish various types of health care programs for 
their citizens who cannot afford to purchase either health care or health care 
insurance .. See infra notes 107-25 and accompanying text. 
21. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); Harris v. 
McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (no constitutional right to have an abortion funded); 
Wideman v. Shallowford Community Hosp., Inc., 826 F.2d 1030 (11th Cir. 1987) 
(no duty based on either the federal constitution or statutes to require states or 
counties to provide medical care for the medically indigent); Elloit v. Enrlich, 280 
N.W.2d 637, 641 (Neb. 1979) (welfare benefits are not fundamental rights and 
neither the state nor the federal government are under any constitutional 
obligation to guarantee the minimum levels of support). 
22. Wendy E. Parmet, Health Care and the Constitution: Public Health and 
the Role of the State in the Framing Era, 20 HASTINGS CaNST. L.Q. 267, 319-30 
(1993). 
Some students of health care policy did not believe that states would provide 
effective health care programs. Frank J. Thompson, New Federalism and Health 
Care Policy: States and the Old Question, 11 J. HEALTH POL. POL'y & L. 647, 647-
48 (1986). Others believe that a comprehensive federal health care program 
could exceed federal authority. See David Rivkin, Health Care Reform v. The 
Founders, WALL ST. J., Sept. 29, 1993, at A19 ("If the legality of a health care 
package featuring federally mandated universal participation is litigated and the 
system is upheld, it will mark the final extension of an originally modest grant of 
federal authority."). 
23. Parmet, supra note 22, at 319-30. 
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2. Federal Responsibility for Medical Care 
During the last three decades, the federal government estab-
lished two major medical care and assistance programs. One of 
these programs is Health Insurance for the Aged,24 a federal 
social insurance program better known as Medicare. Medicare 
consists of two insurance programs: (1) Part A-Hospital Insur·· 
ance Benefits for the Aged and Disabled,25 and (2) Part B- Sup-
plementing Medical Insurance Benefits For the Aged and 
Disabled.26 Under both Parts A and B, individuals less than 65 
years of age are not permitted to enroll in Medicare unless they 
are disabled.27 
The other major federal program is Grants to States for Medi-
cal Assistance Program,28 is better known as Medicaid. Medicaid 
is a state health care assistance program subsidized by the federal 
government.29 Medicaid provides medical assistance for the poor, 
disabled and aged, as well as minor dependent children and their 
parents.30 The states establish minimum eligibility and medical 
service standards that must be consistent with federal guide-
lines.31 However, federal Medicare and Medicaid do not necessar-
ily mean that constitutional authority rests with the federal 
government for providing and securing health care for the states 
and their citizens. Perhaps it just took the initiative, or the 
power. 
Moreover, the expansive preemptive effect of employee benefit 
regulation does not mean that the federal government' has a con-
stitutional health care obligation. During the past three decades, 
24. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1396d (1988 & Supp. III 1991). 
25. 42 U.S.C. § 1395c (Supp. III 1991). 
26. 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1988). 
27. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395c, 1395; (1988 & Supp. III 1991). 
28. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396u (1988 & Supp. III 1991). Medicare does not 
preempt state administrative regulations that regulate the billing and amount 
physicians and hospitals charge patients receiving medical care and assistance 
under Medicare. See Medical Soc'y v. Cuomo, 976 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1992); New 
York State Soc'y of Orthopaedic Surgeons, Inc. v. Gould, 796 F. Supp. 67 
(E.D.N.Y. 1992); Massachusetts Medical Soc'y v. Dukakis, 637 F. Supp. 684 (D. 
Mass. 1986), aff'd, 815 F.2d 790 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 896 (1987). 
One federal court referred to the state regulation of billings and costs as 
"cooperative federalism." See also Rebaldo v. Cuomo, 749 F.2d 133, 140 (2d Cir. 
1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1008 (1985). 
29. 42 U.S.C. § 1396. 
30.Id. 
31. 42 U.S.C. § 1346a (1988 & Supp. III 1991). 
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Congress has steadfastly refused to enact a comprehensive health 
care program for the nation.32 Due to this inaction by Congress, 
the contents of employee benefit plans are still based upon free 
contract, not federal employee benefit regulation. Any relation-
ship between health care policy and welfare benefit policy was cre-
ated in the 1940s and 1950S33 by employer's programs to recruit 
and retain employees.34 Under ERISA and other employee benefit 
policy, Congress did not encourage this relationship nor did it · 
entirely abrogate the common law.35 Practically speaking, the 
preemption of state health care policy by ERISA is not designed to 
maintain federal regulatory dominance of health care, but to pro-. 
vide consistent and uniform regulation of the administration of 
employee benefit plans.36 
In conclusion, the better governmental obligation for the reg-
ulation of health care under federalism is to recognize that federal 
and state governments should share responsibilities for their citi-
zens' health and welfare. However, state governments should 
32. See Boblinski, supra note 1, at 340-41; Ackerman, supra note 7, at 826~ 
29. 
33. D.L. GIFFORD, & C.A. SELTZ, FUNDAMENTALS OF FLEXIBLE COMPENSATION 
5 (1988). Gifford & Seltz describe the employers' rationale for gratuitously 
granting employee health care and other benefits as follows: 
The 1940s produced dramatic changes. High wartime taxes on 
corporate income ... rekindled employer interest in the deductibility of 
retirement plan contributj.ons. In addition, . . . wage stabilization 
programs in place during World War Il(and later the Korean Conflict) 
increased union receptivity to other forms of compensation provided by ' 
the employer-namely, fringe benefits. Later in the decade, court 
decisions made pension and we,lfare benefits a matter for collective 
bargaining. Finally, advances in medical technology not only increased 
the efficacy of medical care but also raised the price, making it difficult 
for individuals to afford the cost except on a group basis. 
The result of these changes was a major shift in responsibility for ' 
security from the individual to the employer and widespread availability 
of employee benefit coverage. 
Id. at 5. 
34. Note, Pension Plans and the Rights of the Retired Worker, 70 COLUM. L. 
REV. 909, 917 (1970); Ferdinand S. Tinio, Annotation, Private Pension Plan: 
Construction of Provision Authorizing Employer to Terminate or Modify Plan, 46 
A.L.R.3d 464, 464 (1972 & Supp. 1993); Gifford & Seltz, supra note 33, at 5p; 
David Gregory, The Scope of ERISA Preemption of State Law: A Study in 
Effective Federalism, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 427, 437-40 (1987). 
35. See 29 U.S.C. § 1051(1) (1988 & Supp. III 1991) (health care and other 
welfare benefits do not vest under ERISA); see also infra notes 48-62 and 
accompanying text. 
36. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). 
10
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play the dominant role. Therefore, the federal law should allow, 
and then assist, states in designing comprehensive state health 
care policy. 
3. State Health Care Regulation 
During the past three decades, states have enacted considera-
ble regulation mandating health care and health-related benefits. 
These regulations required benefits for drug and alcohol abuse, 
job-related disability, and physical and mental health care.37 
Finding that health care was inaccessible to many of their citi-
zens, many states proposed state health care programs.38 These 
programs require employers and others either to provide health 
care benefits under employee benefit plans39 or to pass on health 
care costs, through imposing a surcharge on patients' medical 
bills, to employee benefit plans.40 These plans provided employee 
health care benefits and were ERISA regulated plans.41 Thus, 
these state programs were, in many instances, successfully chal-
lenged as preempted by section 1144(a) ofERISA.42 Nevertheless, 
because of persistent problems involving health care, and increas-
ing health care costs, effective health care policy still remains a 
priority for many states,43 notwithstanding existing state medical 
37. J . Ford, State-Mandated Employee Benefits: Conflict With Federal Law, 
Apr. 1992, MONTHLY LAB. REV. 38. "States have enacted more than 700 laws 
mandating provisions in healtl\.insurance plans ... since 1965." Id. at 38. 
Several states have enacted legislation mandating treatment for alcohol and 
drug abuse. Forty states have mandated treatment for alcohol abuse, while 22 
states have mandated treatment for drug abuse. Much state health care benefit 
legislation was enacted after the paSSEl,ge of The Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). Id. at 40. 
38. Christine Woolsey, ERISA Used To Challenge State Health Laws , Bus. 
INS., Sept. 28, 1992, at 1. 
39. Ford, supra note 37, at 40; See infra notes 101-82 and accompanying text. 
40. Woolsey, supra note 38, at 1 and 74. 
41. 29 U.s.C. § 1002(2) (1988 & Supp. III 1991); See infra notes 48-50 and 
accompanying text. 
42. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988). 
43. Jerry Geisel & M. Schacher, States Seize Reins of Health Care Reform, 
Bus: INS., June 15, 1993, at 1. State legislative efforts to increase access to 
health care are not new. Several states had passed comprehensive health care 
programs that were subsequently preempted by ERISA. Ackerman, supra note 
7, at 826 n .13; infra notes 112, 190, and accompanying text. Currently, several 
states are pursuing a waiver to the ERISA preemption clause. In recent budget 
legislation, a House committee agreed to extend waivers to Hawaii, Minnesota, 
and New York Mark A. Hofmann, States Could Win Waivers of ERISA, Bus. 
INS., May 17, 1993, at 1. 
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assistance for the needy and indigent,44 voluntary state man-
dated-benefit regulation,45 federal medical care for the aged and 
disabled,46 and national health care reform.47 Finally, much state 
health care law and public policy is directly affected by federal 
labor and employment law. 
C. The Influence of Federal Employment Policy 
As part of federal employment and labor regulation, ERISA 
regulates the administration of employee welfare48 and pension49 
benefit plans. It requires employers and plan administrators to 
comply with administrative requirements and provides substan-
tive rights for employees.5o It neither regulates the contents of 
nor mandates employer-sponsored employee benefit plans.51 Sim-
ply, in regulating plan administration and creating benefit plan 
rights, it prevents employee benefit plan abuses.52 ERISA man-
dates reporting and disclosure requirements, 53 funding, participa-
tion, and vesting requirements, 54 and fiduciary standards 55 in the 
regulation of the administration of employee benefit plans. 56 
ERISA grants employees, retirees, and their dependents the right 
to bring claims against employers and plan administrators; thus 
protecting rights and enforcing obligations owed under employee 
welfare and pension benefit plans. 57 By imposing requirements 
upon employers and relief for retirees and employees, ERISA 
establishes a uniform and consistent framework for the regulation 
of the administration of employee benefit plans. 
To maintain uniform and consistent federal regulation, the 
preemption clause of ERISA supersedes all state law that 
44. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a-1396s (1988 & Supp. 1991). 
45. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 727-30 
(1985); Ford, supra note 37, at 39-40. 
46. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1396s (1988 & Supp. III 1991). 
47. Hofmann & Fletcher, supra note 3, at 1; Fletcher, supra note 3, at 24; 
Geisel, supra note 1, at 1. 
48. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1988 & Supp. III 1991). 
49. Id. at § 1002(2). 
50. Id. at § 1051-61. 
51. Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 732. 
52. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(1) (1988 & Supp. III 1991). 
53. Id. at §§ 1021-31. 
54. Id. at §§ 1051-86. 
55. Id. at §§ 1101-14. 
56. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(c). 
57. Id. at § 1132(a)(1)(b). 
A. 
all . 
Id. I 
6J 
12
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 3 [1994], Art. 4
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol16/iss3/4
[Vol. 16:405 
mtary state man-
~ for the aged and 
~inally, much state 
lffected by federal 
~y 
regulation, ERISA 
re48 and pension49 
administrators to 
provides subs tan-
es the contents of 
aefit plans.51 Sim-
ating benefit plan 
~s. 52 ERISA man-
funding, participa-
standards 55 in the 
e benefit plans. 56 
pendents the right 
ministrators; thus 
!d under employee 
sing requirements 
lmployees, ERISA 
: for the regulation 
;. 
'al regulation, the 
I state law that 
471 U.S. 724, 727-30 
" supra note 3, at 24; 
1994] FEDERAL HEALTH CARE 417 
"relate[s] to" employee benefit plans,58 except for those laws 
addressed in sections 1144(b)(2)59 and 1003(b)(3).60 The United 
States Supreme Court has consistently given a broad interpreta-
tion to ERISA's preemption clause.61 In some instances, this 
interpretation allows federal courts to invalidate much state com-
mon law and public policy, for example health care law and 
policy.62 
II. THE PREEMPTION CLAUSE AND ITS INTERPRETATION 
Section 1144(a) of ERISA does not preempt all state law and 
public policy. ERISA exempts certain state law and public policy 
from preemption, but it still prohibits states from making law that 
would either directly or indirectly regulate the contents of 
employee benefit plans. The preemptive effects have broadly 
invalidated many common law principles, legislative acts, and 
public policy. In short, ERISA limits the regulation of employee 
benefit plans by states, even though the state interest is a legiti-
mate one, such as increasing accessibility to and paying for health 
care. 
A. The Preemption Clause, Section 1144(a) 
Section 1144(a) declares that ERISA "shall supersede any and 
all state laws insofar as they ... relate to ... any employee benefit 
plan ... ,"63 and thus pr.eempts a variety of state law, such as 
health care, tort, employment, and contract law.64 The complexity 
of section 1144 and its express exemptions under sections 1144(b) 
Id. 
58. Id. at § 1144(a); Note, supra note 34, at 917. 
59. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (1988 & Supp. III 1991). 
60. Id. at § 1003(b)(3). This section provides in pertinent part: 
(b) The provisions of this subchapter shall not apply to any 
employee benefit plan if-
(3) such plan is maintained solely for the purpose of complying with 
applicable workmen's compensation laws or unemployment 
compensation or disability insurance laws. 
61. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 732; infra notes 85-98 and 
accompanying text. 
62. Infra notes 86-98 and accompanying text. 
63. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988 & Supp. III 1991). In construing "relate to," the 
language of section 514(a), the Court gave "relate to" its ordinary meaning, "a 
connection with or reference to." Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97 
(1983). 
64. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c) (1988 & Supp. III 1991). 
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and 1003(b) have resulted in considerable litigation determining 
whether or not state law is preempted by ERISA. ERISA has pre-
empted state laws that "provide an alternative cause of action to ' 
employees to collect benefits protected by ERISA, which refer spe-
cifically to ERISA plans and apply solely to them, or interfere with 
the calculation of benefits owed to an employee."65 ERISA usually 
has not preempted state common law and regulations that "are 
laws of general application-often traditional exercises of state 
power or regulatory authority- whose effect on ERISA plan~ is ' 
incidental."66 Thus the state law preempted by ERISA falls into 
the two broa9. categories of traditional and nontraditional fields of 
legitimate state interest. , ' ' ,-
Health care policy is a nontraditional, ' or perhaps a lesser, 
area of state interest. But formulating health care policy at the 
state level is not new. At the time of ERISA's enactment in 1974, 
state comprehensive health care plans existed and others were 
being designed. Admittedly, however, health care regulation is 
not one of those traditional state functions that would be saved 
from the ERISA preemption clause.67 On the other hand, many 
insurance, tort, contract, and employment regulations are tradi-
tional fields of state law. ERISA grants express exceptions for a 
few traditional state functions from its coverage under section 
1003(b)(3).68 In addition, ERISA provides for certain exemptions 
65. AETNA Life Ins. Co. v. Brn;ges, 869 F.2d 142, 146 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. 
denied., 493 U.S. 811 (1990). 
66. See Borges, 869 F .2d at 146; see infra note 140 and accompanying text. 
Federal courts have applied a multifactor test to determine whether or not' 
ERISA "relate[sl to" and thus preempts state law. Van Camp v. AT&T, 963 F.2d 
119, 122-123 (6th Cir. 1992); Arkansas Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. St. Mary's 
Hosp., Inc., 947 F.2d 1341, 1344-45 (8th Cir. 1991) (list offactors to be considered 
in determining whether or not general state law "relates to" ERISA plan); supra 
note 140 and accompanying text. 
67. Infra notes 110, 173, and accompanying text. The obligation of the states 
to provide health care for their citizens is not resolved. See Parmet, supra note 
22, at 267. In Standard Oil Co. v. Agsalud, 442 F . Supp. 695 (N.D. Cal. 1977), the 
district court found that health care regulation was a traditional function of state 
government. The district court stated that: 
Regulation of health insurance benefits available to workers is not a 
function like "fire prevention, police protection, sanitation, public 
health, and parks and recreation" which are "typical of those performed 
by state and local governments in discharging their dual functions of 
administering the public law and furnishing public services." 
Id. at 710 (quoting National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 851 (1976». 
68. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b) (1988 & Supp. III 1991); infra notes 79-84 and 
accompanying text. 
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from preemption under section 1144(b).69 Health care law is 
neither excepted from coverage nor exempted from preemption 
under ERISA. 
B. Statutory Exemptions and Exceptions to Preemption 
Section 1144(a), the preemption clause, is limited by several 
exceptions and exemptions. Section 1144(b) grants explicit 
exemptions from section 1144(a) for banking, security, and insur-
ance regulation.70 Section 1144(b)(2)(A),71 which is actually a sav-
ings clause,72 provides, with one exception, that nothing in ERISA 
"shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law 
of any state which regulates insurance, banking, or securities."73 
Under this provision states cannot declare employee benefit plans 
to be insurance or insurance-related and thus avoid preemption 
under ERISA. In addition, section 1144(b)(2)(B),74 the deemer 
clause,75 provides that no employee-benefit plan "shall be deemed 
to be an insurance company or other insurer . .. or to be engaged 
in the business of insurance . . . for purposes of any law of any 
[d. 
[d. 
69. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b); infra notes 70-78 and accompanying text. 
70. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A). This section provides in pertinent part: 
(b) Construction and application. (1) This section shall not apply with 
respect to any cause of action which arose, or any act or omission which 
occurred, before January 1, 1975. 
(2)(A) Except as provided in..subparagraph (B), nothing in. this title 
shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any 
State which regulates insurance, banking, or securities. 
71. [d. 
72. See Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 737-47. 
73. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A); see Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 724. 
74. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B). This section provides in pertinent part: 
(b) Construction and application. (1) This section shall not apply with 
respect to any cause of action which arose, or any act or omission which 
occurred, before January 1, 1975. 
(2)(A) ... 
(B) Neither an employee benefit plan described in section 4(a), which is 
not exempt under section 4(b) other than a plan established primarily 
for the purpose of providing death benefits), nor any trust established 
under any such a plan, shall be deemed to be an insurance company or 
other ins}lrer, bank, trust company, or investment company or to be 
engaged in the business of insurance or banking for purposes of any law 
of any State purporting to regulated insurance companies, insurance 
coritracts, banks, trust companies, or investment companies. 
75. See Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 724. 
15
Holloway: ERISA, Preemption and Comprehensive Federal Health Care: A Call f
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1994
420 CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:405 
state purporting to regulate insurance companies [or] insurance 
contracts."76 ERISA does not preempt insurance regulation but 
limits state power to declare employee benefit plans to be insur-
ance indirectly regulating these plans. Next, section 1144(b)(4) 
grants an exemption for state criminal law.77 Finally, section 
1144(b) of ERISA grants a limited exemption for the Hawaii Pre-
paid Health Care Program.78 Other states are requesting similar 
exemptions, but Congress has shown no willingness to grant 
them.79 
ERISA also grants exceptions from its coverage. Exceptions 
are granted for employee benefit plans of government,80 state 
workers' compensation,81 state disability benefits,82 and employee 
benefit plans of churches.83 ERISA contains ·an exception for state 
qualified domestic orders.84 These exceptions recognize funda-
mental state interests that are traditional functions in which 
states exercise police and other powers. In essence, ERISA 
preempts many state exercises of power, and only gives way to the 
most fundamental of state interests.85 
C. State Law and Preemption 
ERISA has preempted much state common law and public 
policy. Specifically, ERISA has preempted a state wrongful dis-
76. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (1.988 & Supp. III 1991). 
77. [d. at § 1144(b)(4) (Subsection (a) shall not apply to any generally 
applicable criminal law of a State). 
78. Id. at 1144(b)(2)(5). This section provides: 
(5)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), subsection (a) shall 
not apply to the Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act (Haw. Rev. Stat. 
§§ 393-1 through 393-51). 
(B) Nothing in subparagraph (A) shall be construed to exempt from 
subsection (a)-
(i) any state tax law relating to employee benefit plans, or, 
(ii) any amendment of the Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act enacted 
after September 2, 1974, to the extent it provides for more than the 
effective administration of such Act as in effect on such date. 
Id. See infra note 109 and accompanying text. 
79. Hofmann, supra note 43, at 1. 
80. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1). 
81. Id. § 1003(b)(3). 
82.Id. 
83. Id. § 1003(b)(2). 
84. Id. § 1144(b)(7). 
85. See David L. Gregory, ERISA Law in the Rehnquist Court, 42 SYRACUSE 
L. REV. 945, 957-64 (1991). 
1994] 
97. See 
98. See 
text. 
16
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 3 [1994], Art. 4
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol16/iss3/4
[Vol. 16:405 
[or] insurance 
regulation but 
ns to be insur-
tion 1144(b)(4) 
~inally, section 
he Hawaii Pre-
uesting similar 
pless to grant 
ge. Exceptions 
nment,80 state 
2 and employee 
eption for state 
cognize funda-
tions in which 
3sence, ERISA 
;ives way to the 
law and public 
e wrongful dis-
to any generally 
~ction (a) shall 
tWo Rev. Stat. 
·0 exempt from 
lns, or, 
.re Act enacted 
nore than the 
:late. 
'ourt, 42 SYRACUSE 
1994] FEDERAL HEALTH CARE 421 
charge claim,86 an anti-subrogation law,87 a tort and contract law 
claim,88 a common law insurance claim,89 and specific provisions 
of workers' compensation acts.90 The Court has held that ERISA 
preempts state common law and statutory claims that "relate to" 
employee benefit plans. Inductively, from the Court's holdings, 
federal courts have concluded that preemption of state law occurs 
where the state law provides claims that establish "an alternative 
cause of action to employees to collect benefits protected by 
ERISA, refers specifically to ERISA plans and applies solely to 
them, or interferes with the calculation of benefits owed to an 
employee."91 More succinctly, ERISA does not permit states to 
directly or indirectly regulate employee benefit plans, except when 
ERISA expressly grants exception to or exemption from 
preemption. 
Notwithstanding its expansive construction, the preemption 
clause is neither absolute nor indiscriminate.92 Under the Court's 
interpretation of section 1144(a), it has held that ERISA does not 
preempt state-mandated benefit regulation,93 crimina,llaw,94 sev-
erance pay at plant closings,95 and garnishment of ERISA welfare 
benefit plans.96 State common law and public policy which are not 
preempted by ERISA are traditional areas in which states rou-
tinely exercise police and other powers,97 and thus have only "inci-
dental effects" on ERISA regulated plans.98 In conclusion, the 
express exceptions and exemptions, along with the "incidental 
effects" of traditional state pawer, do not save state health care 
86. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133 (1990). 
87. FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52 (1990). 
88. Pilot-Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987). 
89. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (1987). 
90. Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504 (1981); District of 
Columbia v. Greater Washington Bd. of Trade, 113 S. Ct. 580 (1992); See infra 
notes 124-57 and accompanying text. 
91. AETNA Life Ins. Co. v. Borges, 869 F.2d 142, 146 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. 
denied, 493 U.S. 811 (1989). 
92. Gregory, supra note 85, at 958. 
93. Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. 724 (1985). 
94. Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107 (1989); See also 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1144(b)(4) (1988 & Supp. 1991). 
95. Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1 (1987). 
96. Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., 486 U.S. 825 (1988). 
97. See Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 727-30. 
98. See Mackey, ' 486 U.S. at 830-38; See infra note 140 and accompanying 
text. 
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law and public policy from preemption under section 1144(a) of 
ERISA. 
III. PREEMPTION AND STATE HEALTH CARE POLICY 
Currently, states are recognizing that many of their citizens 
do not have access to adequate health care. In addition, states are 
feeling pressure to address deep concerns over the plight of unin-
sured and underinsured citizens. In attempting to respond to 
these concerns, states are realizing that their ability to develop a 
public policy with respect to health care is severely restrained by 
ERISA. They are also finding that ERISA makes the state public 
policy issue of health care more difficult to address. States are 
finding that the broad interpretation of the ERISA preemption 
clause, and the narrow interpretation of the exemption provisions, 
stymie efforts to provide access to and pay for health care.99 In 
attempting to overcome these barriers, the reform of state health 
care law and public policy has been achieved by several regulatory 
means. 
One of the means used by states is mandated-benefit regula-
tion. Under mandateq.-benefits regulation, states require insur-
ance companies to provide coverage for certain types of illness, 
such as mental illness and substance abuse. 100 Becaus~ ERISA 
neither directly mandates nor permits states to require employer-
sponsored health car.e obligations, states · are forced to indirectly 
mandate health care benefits by hnposing benefit-related obliga-
tions on insurance companies which, in turn, means that employ-
ers will provide these health care benefits if they voluntarily 
choose to purchase group health care insurance.lOl 
Mandated-benefit regulation, however, does not resolve the 
states' concerns over health care since it does not provide benefits 
for the unemployed, indigent, and uninsurable. Because access to 
health care is still needed, and voluntarily mandated-benefits reg-
ulation has proven inadequate,102 states have continued to try 
more ingenious, indirect means of providing health care. · For 
99. See supra notes 1 and 7 and accompanying text. 
100. Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 728-29. 
101. See id. at 747-48. 
102. Employees have no right to employee welfare benefits that . are 
gratuitously provided by their employers. Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 732; 
McGariri v. H.H. Music Co., 946 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 
482 (1992); Hamilton v. Travelers Ins. Co., 752 F.2d 1350 (8th Cir. 1985). 
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example, states have enacted hospital surcharges and fees,103 
health care continuation coverage,104 employee benefit-related 
taxes,105 and hospital cost containment regulations.106 Few of 
these means, however, have survived preemption challenges 
under the ERISA preemption clause. 
To overcome the preemptive effects of ERISA, states have 
asked Congress to amend the ERISA preemption clause. They 
seek to obtain either a blanket exemption from preemption for 
state health care law or a specific exemption for each state's 
health care law.107 In spite of the ERISA preemption clause, 
states have , enacted comprehensive health care programs that 
The Health Security Proposal, supra note 5, would impose fiduciary 
obligations on employers participating in regional and corporate health alliances. 
President's Health Plan, supra note 5, at 78. 
103. See infra notes 112-24 and accompanying text. 
104. See infra note 105 and accompanying text. 
105. National Carriers' Conference Comm. v. Heffernan, 454 F. Supp. 914 (D. 
Conn. 1978) (preempts state tax that is levied on benefits paid by employee 
benefit plan); Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. v. Tax Appeals Tribunal of New York 
State Dept. of Taxation & Fin., 569 N.Y.S.2d 502 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (preempts 
state taxes on plan earnings). But see Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Neusser, 
810 F.2d 550 (6th Cir. 1987) (does not preempt municipal income tax that is 
assessed on employees). For a comment on the preemption of state tax law by 
ERISA, see Kevin Matz, Note, ERISA's Preemption of State Tax Laws, 61 
FORDHAM L. REV. 401 (1992). 
For cases on the taxation of insurers, see generally . General Motors Corp. v. 
California State Bd., 815 F.2d ~1305 (9th Cir. 1987), reh'g denied, 824 F.2d 816 
(9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 941 (1988) (does not preempt state tax that 
is assessed against insurers and calculated with reference to ERISA plans 
because such state taxes are exempted under the savings clause); Mutual Life 
Ins. Co. v. Insurance Bureau, 399 N.W.2d 466 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (does not 
preempt state tax on gross revenues from insurance premiums). 
106. See, e.g., Rebaldo v. Cuomo, 749 F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 
U.s. 1008 (1985) (ERISA does not preempt state law that prohibits benefit plans 
from negotiating a discount with hospitals); but see infra notes 112-24 and 
accompanying text. Later, Rebaldo was accorded limited weight in United Wire 
Metal & Mach. Health & Welfare Fund v. Morristown Memorial Hosp., 793 F. 
Supp. 524, 537 (D.N.J. 1992). However, its demise was premature. United Wire 
Metal & Mach. Health & Welfare Fund v. Morristown Memorial Hosp., 995 F.2d 
1179, 1194 (3d Cir. 1993). In United Wire, the court of appeals found that "a 
portion of the Rebaldo court's analysis remains persuasive," though other 
portions did not survive Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 489 U.S. 133 (1990). 
In distinguishing the two cases, the court of appeals stated that "it was the 
absence of a direct nexus to ERISA plans and limited nature of the statute's 
impact on such plans that put the pricing regulation in Rebaldo beyond the scope 
of § 514 preemption." Id. at 1195. 
107. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
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consist of state-sponsored health care insurance as well as federal 
and state subsidized medical assistance. An example of a compre-
hensive state health care program is the Oregon Basic Health Ser-
vice Plan. 108 
The comprehensive programs do not mandate employer-spon~ 
sored health care benefits which would be preempted by ERISA. 
However, there is one exception to the preemption of employer 
sponsored programs. The Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act man-
dates employer-sponsored health care benefits. 109 The Hawaii 
health care program is given a statutory exemption from preemp-
tion under section 1144(b)Yo Notwithstanding ingenious a:q.d 
innovative means, most state health care law does not success-
fully survive preemption challenges. In many instances states 
have been, and continue to be, plainly denied the right to "experi-
108. See generally, Eric Lamond Robinson, Note, The Oregon Basic Health 
Care Services Act: A Model for State Reform, 45 VAND. L. REV. 977 (1992); 
Kenneth K. Schmitt, Waiver quest: Oregon's Attempt to Re-Ration Health Care, 
36 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 947 (1992); Note, The Oregon Health Care Proposal and the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, 106 HAav. L. REV. 1296 (1993); W. John 
Thomas, The Oregon Medicaid Proposal: Ethical Paralysis, Tragic Democracy, 
and the Fate ofa Utilitarian Health Care Program, 72 OR. L. REV. 47 (1993). In 
March 1993, the Clinton Administration approved the Oregon Plan by granting 
Oregon the necessary Medicaid waiver. C. Connel, White House OKs Oregon 
Health Plan, DAILY REFLECTOR, March 20, 1993, at Al. 
109. HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 393-1 to 393-51 (1974). Upon the enactment of 
ERISA, Hawaii's health ca re program was preempted by ERISA. Standard Oil 
Co. v. Agsalud, 442 F. Supp. 695 (N.D. Cal. 1977), aff'd, 633 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 
1980), aff'd mem., 454 U.S. 801 (1981). Later, Congress granted the Hawaii 
Prepaid Health Care Act of 1974 an exemption from preemption under section 
1144. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(5)(AHb)(5)(C) (1988 & Supp. III 1991); see ERISA: 
Exemption from Preemption for Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act: Hearing on 
H.R. 4046 Before the Subcomm. on Labor-Management Relations of the Comm. 
on Education and Labor, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1982). 
However, Congress did not exempt future amendments other than those 
amendments to provide "for . . . effective administration." 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1144(b)(5)(B)(ii); see Council of Hawaii Hotels v. Agsalud, 594 F. Supp. 449 (D. 
Haw. 1984). The district court found that ERISA preempted the 1978 
Amendment to the Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act that required collectively 
bargained health care plans to provide state mandated health care benefits. The 
district court concluded that the 1978 amendment was exempted from 
preemption under 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(5)(B)(ii) in that the 1978 amendment 
provided for "more than the effective administration" of the Hawaii Prepaid 
Health Care Act that was in effect before September 2, 1974. Agsalud, 594 F. 
Supp. at 453. For the pertinent language of 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(5), see supra 
note 78: 
110. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(5)(A)-(b)(5)(C) (1988 & Supp. III 1991). 
20
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ment with novel legislation" to further their own public inter-
ests. 111 Hospital surcharges and fees are two such examples. 
A. Hospital Surcharges and Fees: Preempted and Not 
Preempted 
A few states, either as part of a comprehensive health care 
plan or as an effort to increase access to health care services, have 
enacted statutes imposing hospital surcharges and fees on 
patients' bills paid by commercial insurers or on services provided 
by Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs).112 These sur-
charges and fees allow states to shift costs to ERISA regulated 
employee benefit plans for both the insured and uninsured, the 
costs resulting from increasing accessibility to health care for both 
indigents and those who are employed but uninsured. 113 
Several states have enacted hospital surcharges and fees. 
State and federal courts have not agreed on whether or not ERISA 
preempts all hospital surcharges and fees. First, New Jersey 
enacted a state hospital reimbursement system that required self-
insured plans to pay in excess of actual charges, but this regula-
tory scheme was eventually held not to be preempted by 
ERISA.114 Second, Minnesota enacted the MinnesotaCare Pro-
111. See Ackerman, supra note 7, at 829. 
112. Woolsey, supra note 38, at 74. As of 1987, six states financed charity care 
through a special add-on rate to hospital charges: Connecticut, Maine, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New York. Boblinski, supra note 1, 
at 334 n.279, citing, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INSTITUTE, Employer-
Provided Health Benefits: Legislative Initiatives, 62 EBRI ISSUE BRIEF 10 
(1987» . 
113. Sarah Lyall, Billing System For Hospitals Is Overturned: U.S. Ruling 
Threatens Subsidies in New York, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1993, at B.1; ERISA Does 
Not Preempt Hospital Surcharge, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLAN REV., August 1993, at 
75-76 (comment on United Wire, Metal & Machine Health & Welfare Fund V. 
Morristown Memorial Hosp., 793 F. Supp. 524 (D.N.J. 1992), modified 995 F.2d 
1179 (3d Cir. 1993». 
i14. United Wire, Metal & Machine Health & Welfare Fund V. Morristown 
Memorial Hosp., 793 F. Supp. 524, 537 (D.N.J. 1992), modified, 995 F.2d 1179 
(3d Cir. 1993). New Jersey hospital rate setting scheme force self-insured plans 
to pay in excess of actual charges. These plans had to pay: "costs of care for the 
indigent, charges to pay a hospital's bad debts, subsidies for the medicare 
program, and funds to reimburse hospitals for discounts given by the hospitals to 
other types of benefit plans." United Wire, Metal & Machine Health & Welfare 
Fund V. Morristown Memorial Hosp., 793 F. Supp. 524, 537 (D.N.J. 1992), 
modified, 995 F.2d 1179 (3d Cir. 1993). The district court found that the New 
Jersey statute would undermine the uniform and consistent regulation of the 
administration of employee benefit plans. Id. at 537. Moreover, the court 
21
Holloway: ERISA, Preemption and Comprehensive Federal Health Care: A Call f
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1994
426 CAMPBELL LAw REVIEW [Vol. 16:405 
gram that "requires hospitals to pay a 2% tax on gross revenues to 
help cover tJ;1e state's uninsured .... "115 The MinnesotaCare Pro-
gram has been challenged by a self-insured plan as violating the 
preemption clause of ERISA. 116 Third, New York enacted a state 
health care provision that imposed a surcharge on hospital bills of 
patients covered by commercial health insurers and HMOs.117 
concluded that the New Jersey statute forces the benefit plans to "structure 
themselves in a certain manner, and to pay hospital costs that accrue to non-
beneficiaries." Id.; see also, Bricklayers Local No.1 Welfare Fund v. Louisiana 
Health Ins. Assoc., 771 F. Supp. 771 (E.D. La. 1991). But the court of appeals did 
not agree. It held that the New Jersey statute was not preempted by ERISA. 
United Wire, 995 F.2d at 1196. The court of appeals stated that: 
More importantly, there are many forms of state regulation under the 
police power which result in increases in the cost of doing business and 
corresponding increases in prices where the beneficiaries of the 
regulation are not those who are paying the increased prices .... We are 
confident, however, that ERISA was not intended to foreclose a state 
regulation of this kind. 
Id. Although New Jersey shifted the cost of health care to hospital by imposing 
an added cost onto employee benefit plans, the court of appeals found this 
exercise of police power, imposing a surcharge, to result only in an increase in the 
cost of doing business. In turn, hospitals can pass health care cost forward to 
employee benefit plans as an increase in the prices of health care services. 
In United Wire, the court of appeals held that the New Jersey statute "do[es] 
not constitute an unlawful taking of property without just compensation." Id. at 
1190-91. See also, Morristown Memorial Hosp., 793 F. Supp. at 540-42 (district 
court holding-that statute did not constitute an unlawful taking). However, that 
holding may not be th; 'last word on whether the regulation of health care costs 
through controlling doctor's fees constitutes a regulatory taking, an interference 
with property and economic rights. See Edward Felsenthal, AMA to Fight Limits 
on Doctor's Fees, WALL ST. J., Sept. 9, 1993, at B7 (AMA report believes that 
limits on doctor's fees could violate the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution). 
115. Id. 
116. MinnesotaCare's first phase, which was passed in 1992, "provides state-
subsidized health insurance." MinnesotaCare is expected to cost $320 million by 
1997 and to cover 320,000 uninsured citizens. M. Jordan, MinnesotaCare Health 
Reform (Associated Press), DAILY REFLECTOR, May 24, 1993, at A4. 
MinnesotaCare is funded by a "2% percent tax on gross receipts of health care 
providers." Id. MinnesotaCare is not Minnesota's first effort to enact a 
comprehensive health care program. An earlier Minnesota health care program 
was also preempted by ERISA. See St. Paul Elec. Workers Welfare Fund v. 
Markman, 490 F. Supp. 931 (D. Minn. 1980). 
117. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 2807-c(1)(b) (McKinney 1992) amended 
1993; See also Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 813 F. Supp. 996, 999-1000 (S.D.N.Y. 
1993); Woolsey, supra note 38, at 1. 
In Travelers Ins. Co., New York established a comprehensive scheme for the 
regulation of inpatient hospital rates. These rates are "determined by the 
22
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The N ew York surcharge was held by a federal district court to be 
preempted by ERISA. 118 The insurers challenged the surcharge, 
and the federal district court found that the 24% (combined 11% 
and 13%) for commercial insurers, and 9% for HMOs, shifted the 
costs of health care to employee benefit plans and thus increased 
plan costsy9 Additionally, the district court did not believe that 
employee benefit plans should be forced to participate in a statu-
tory scheme that "spread[s] the risk of high risk individuals 
among a larger pool."120 Federal courts are mixed on whether 
state health care policy can impose fees or surcharges, either 
directly or indirectly, on employee welfare benefit plans that even-
patient's diagnosis." Travelers Ins. Co. , 813 F. Supp. at 999. The diagnosis 
governed the category or Diagnosis Related Group (DRG) the case is assigned. 
New York Public Health law increased the DRG for inpatient services by 13% 
Id. It imposed a surcharge on inpatient services for all patients covered by 
commercial insurers. Id. It exempted Blue Cross and Blue Shield, health 
maintenance organizations (HMO), and government plans. Id. Thus, patients 
covered by commercial insurers would pay 113% of the DRG rate. On April 2, 
1992, New York added another 11% surcharge on the DRG rate, which was 
already 13%, for inpatient services covered by commercial insurers. Id. at 999-
1000. At the same time, it added a 9% surcharge on HMOs which previously had 
been exempted from the surcharge. Id. at 1000. The Travelers Insurance 
Company, and the New York State Health Maintenance Organization 
Conference as an intervenor, challenged the New York Public Health Law as 
preempted by ERISA. Id. at 999. 
The district court found that the surcharge was not exempted from 
preemption by the saving clause, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1988 & Supp. III 
1991), and thus was preempted by ERISA. Travelers Ins. Co., 813 F. Supp. at 
1002. The surcharge was also not regulating "the business of insurance" under 
the McCarran-Ferguson Act., 15 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988 & Supp. III 1191). 
Travelers Ins. Co. , 813 F. Supp. at 1007. In addition, the court noted that the 
statute imposing the surcharge referred to HMOs and self-insured benefit plans, 
entities which the court stated "are not directly involved with the issuance of 
insurance." Id. at 1008. For a discussion of the application of the McCarron-
Ferguson Act, see infra note 161 and accompanying text . 
118. Travelers Ins. Co. , 813 F. Supp. at 1003. See also , Lyall, supra note 113, 
at Bl. Lyall reported that: "[hlealth-care experts say that yesterday's ruling 
could put New York on the same path as New Jersey, which lost a similar 
lawsuit last year and hastily had to patch together a new way of paying for 
indigent care and setting hospital rates." Id. See also United Health Serv. , Inc. 
v. Upstate Admin. Serv. , Inc., 573 N.Y.S.2d 851 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991) (state court 
found that a similar New York hospital cost containment statute was preempted 
by ERISA). 
119. Travelers Ins. Co., 813 F. Supp. at 1003; see also Lyall, supra note 113, at 
Bl. 
120. Travelers Inc. Co., 813 F. Supp. at 1008; see also Lyall, supra note 113, at 
B7. 
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tually require insured and uninsured (self-funded) plans to "pay 
for uncompensated . health care or to expand health-care 
coverage. "121 
In conclusion, states have sought to shift health care cost to 
commercial insurers and HMOs that insure and provide services 
for employees under employee benefit plans.122 The surcharges 
and fees are more intrusive than mandated-benefits in that they 
are mandatory and cover self-funded plans.123 The preemption of 
surcharges and other fees that "relate to" ERISA regulated plans, 
restricts a "state's flexibility to devise ways to pay for care and 
subsidize health care without insurance."124 
B. Continuation of Health Care Coverage: Preempted 
A few states mandate that employers who provide health care 
coverage must continue to provide this coverage upon an occur-
rence that would cause a break in or termination of employment, 
such as becoming eligible for family leave or receiving worker's 
compensation benefits. This legislation, which is called health 
care continuation coverage,125 has been challenged as being pre-
empted by section 1144(a) of ERISA. An example of one such chal-
lenge is District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Board of 
Trade. 126 . 
121. Woolsey, supra note 35, at 1; Lyall, supra note 113, at Bl. However, the 
situation could even get worse, according to Lyall, in that: 
The ruling [in Travelers Ins. Co.] does not in itself pull down the 
state's hospital financing system, but it begins to chip away at it. In a 
similar case pending in Federal Court in Brooklyn, a group of unions 
have challenged a different state surcharge using the same ERISA 
argument. In that case, the 5.5 percent is tacked on most hospital bills 
and raises $1.1 billion a year that is used to subsidize health care for 
people without insurance. 
Lyall, supra note 113, at B7. 
122. ld. at BI-B7. 
123. ld. 
124. ld. at B7. 
125. See infra notes 126-38 and accompanying text. 
126. 113 S. Ct. 580 (1992) (preempting District of Columbia regulation 
requiring continuation of health care coverage); see also R.R. Donnelly & Son Co. 
v. Prevost, 915 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1415 (1991) (does 
not preempt Connecticut statute requiring continuation of health care coverage 
in which statute was an exception to ERISA coverage under 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1003(b)(3) (1988 & Supp. III 1991»; New Jersey Business & Indus. Ass'n v. 
New Jersey, 592 A.2d 660 (N.J. Super. 1991) (preempting New Jersey Family 
Leave Act that requires employers to continue health benefit plan for absent 
employees during authorized period of family leave); but see Stone & Webster 
24
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1. Greater Washington 
In Greater Washington, the Court addressed an amendment 
to the District of Columbia's Workers' Compensation Act which 
provided for continuing health care benefits for employees eligible 
for workers' compensation benefits. This amendment was called 
the Workers' Compensation Equity Amendment Act (Equity 
Amendment Act) of 1990.127 In section 2(c)(2), the Equity Amend-
ment Act imposes the following requirement: 
Any employer who provides health insurance coverage for an 
employee shall provide health insurance coverage equivalent to 
the exiting health insurance coverage of the employee while the 
employee receives or is eligible to receive workers' compensation 
benefits under this chapter. 128 
Section 2(c)(2) also mandated that employers provide health 
insurance coverage for up to 52 weeks. Furthermore, this section 
required employers to provide coverage "at the same benefit level 
that the employee had at the time the employee received or was 
eligible to receive workers' compensation benefits."129 In Greater 
Washington, the Board of Trade sought to enjoin the enforcement 
Eng'g Corp. v. Ilsly, 690 F.2d 323 (2d Cir. 1982), aff'd mem., 463 U.S. 1220 (1983) 
(preempting a similar Connecticut statute requiring continuation coverage in 
that statute did not relate to an exception under 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(3» . 
The preemption of state law requiring continuation of health care coverage 
has resulted in much professional commentary on the status of the law. See, e.g., 
Dean M. Werner, Group Heal th Coverage Continuation Requirement under 
Federal and State Law, 64 WIS. LAW. 15 (1991); Rosalind Z. Wiggins & Thomas 
Z. Reicher, ERISA Preemption of Connecticut Statutes Providing for 
Continuation of Health Care Coverage, 64 CONN. B.J. 191 (1990); Theresa A. 
Orlaske, Law Changes Affecting Employers' Health Care Continuation 
Obligations, 69 MICH. B.J. 1158 (1990). 
Federal health care continuation coverage law is provided in Title X of the 
Consolidated Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA), 29 U.S.C. § 1161-
1168 (1988 & Supp. 1993). COBRA does not require employers to provide health 
care insurance; however, ifthey do provide this insurance, employers must allow 
employees and/or their dependents to continue participation in the employer's 
group health insurance plan upon termination of employment under certain 
circumstances. 29 U.S.C. § 1161(a) (1988 & Supp. 1993); see M.S, Lapidus & 
L.A. Erbs, Recent COBRA Developments in the Courts, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS J ., 
June 1992, at 1-13; 1992 Business Publications Research, COBRA Court Cases 
Alert Employers to Compliance Pitfalls, MANAGEMENT POLICIES AND PERSONNEL 
LAW, July 1, 1992, at 1-2; Werner, supra. 
127. D.C. CODE ANN. § 36-307 (Supp. 1992). 
128. D.C. CODE ANN. § 36-307(a-1)(1) (Supp. 1992); see Greater Washington, 
113 S. Ct. at 582. 
129. D.C. CODE ANN. § 36-307(a-1)(3) (Supp. 1992). 
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of section 2(c)(2) by arguing that it was preempted by section 
1144(a) of ERISA. The parties agreed that section 2(c)(2) 
"relate[s] to" an ERISA-covered plan in the sense that the benefits 
required under the challenged law "are set by reference to covered 
employee benefit plans."13o "However, the United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia held that [section] 2(c)(2) was 
not preempted because it also related to respondent's workers' 
compensation plan, which is exempt from ERISA coverage .... "131 
Furthermore, in faulty reliance on Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 
Inc. ,132 the district court also found that section 2(c)(2) was not 
130. Greater Washington, 113 S. Ct. at 582-83. 
131. [d. at 583. State workers' compensation acts are exempted from ERISA 
coverage. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(3) (1988 & Supp. III 1991). 
132. 463 U.S. 85 (1983). In Shaw, the New York Human Rights law, N.Y. 
Exec. Law §§ 290-301 (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1982-83), prohibited 
discrimination on the basis of sex. It also prohibited discrimination in employee 
benefit plans, including discrimination on the basis of pregnancy. Shaw, 463 
U.S. at 88. The New York Court of Appeals has held that a private employer 
whose benefit plan treated pregnancy different from any other nonoccupational 
disabilities engaged in sex discrimination. [d. (citing Brooklyn Union Gas-Co. v. 
New York State Human Rights Appeal Board, 359 N.E.2d 393 (1976)). In 
contrast, the U.S. Supreme Court had recently held that discrimination based 
upon pregnancy was not sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (hereinafter Title VII). Shaw, 463 U.S. at 
88 (citing General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976)). In 1978, Congress 
amended Title VII to prohibit sex discrimination based upon pregnancy. 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978,42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)k (hereinafter PDA). 
Prior to the PDA, the New York Human Rights law had a broader coverage than 
Title VII. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 88-89. 
The New York Disability Benefits Law, N.Y. WORK COMPo LAw §§ 200-242 
(McKinney 1965 and Supp. 1982-83), "require[d] employers to pay certain 
benefits to employees I,mable to work because of nonoccupational injuries or 
illness." Shaw, 463 U.S. at 89. The N.Y. Disability Benefits Law was amended 
in August 1977, requiring employers to pay eight weeks of benefits for 
pregnancy-related disabilities. Id. In 1981, the eight week pregnancy payment 
provision was repealed, and the new provision requires employers to treat 
pregnancy as any other disability. [d. at 90. 
In Shaw, plaintiff-appellee Delta Air Lines and others provided medical and 
disability benefits for their employees. Prior to the PDA, appellee's benefits plan 
did not provide benefits to employees disabled by pregnancy as required by N.Y. 
laws. Appellee filed the action alleging that the N.Y. Disability Benefits Law and 
Human Rights Law were preempted by section 1144(a) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1144(a). Shaw, 463 U.S. at 92. 
The district court "held that Human Rights Law was preempted, insofar as it 
required the provision of pregnancy benefits prior to the effective date of the 
PDA." Shaw, 463 U.s. at 92-93. With respect to the Disability Benefits Law, the 
district court concluded that these benefits were exempted under section 
1994] 
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that if, 
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preempted by ERISA "because [the Board of Trade] could comply 
with § 2(c)(2) 'by creating a separate administrative unit to 
administer the required benefit.' "133 
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia reversed the district court judgment and held that section 
2(c)(2) was preempted by ERISA,134 In reaching this decision, the 
court of appeals held "[b]y tying the benefit levels of the workers' 
compensation plan to those provided in an ERISA-covered plan, 
that the Equity Amendment Act could have a serious impact on 
the administration and content of the ERISA-covered plan."135 
On review under a writ of certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court 
affirmed the court of appeals' decision. 13G The Court granted certi-
orari because the decision of the District of Columbia Court of 
Appeals conflicted with the United States Court of Appeals for the 
1003(b)(3) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(3), which exempts state disability law 
from ERISA's coverage. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 93. 
The court of appeals affirmed as to the Human Rights Law, but it remanded 
the district court's finding on the preemption of Disability Benefits Law. It 
concluded that the Disability Benefits Law was exempted from preemption so 
long as the disability benefit plan, "as an integral unit," was maintained solely to 
comply with a disability law. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 94-95 (citing Delta Air Lines, 
Inc. v. Kramarshy, 650 F.2d 1287, 1304 (1981». The court of appeals concluded 
that if, on remand, the district court found that the disability was not a separate 
administrative unit, it would be preempted by ERISA. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 95. 
On review, the Court held "that the Human Rights Law and the Disability 
Benefits Law 'relate to any employee benefit plans' within the meaning of" 
section 1144(a) of ERISA. [d. at 100. In construing the "relate to" language of 
section 1144(a), the Court gave the language its ordinary meaning, "connection 
with or reference to." [d. at 97. In its construction, the Court reviewed the 
legislative history of section 1144(a), further justifying its broad interpretation. 
With respect to whether section 1144(a) preempted state disability law, the 
Court held that it did not. The Court held "that the Disability Benefits Law is 
not preempted by ERISA," although the state permits employers to comply with 
its disability law by including disability benefits in their employee benefit plans. 
[d. at 109. However, the Court stated New York can enforce its disability benefit 
plan, although it is part of a multibenefit ERISA plan. [d. at 108. The Court 
stated that to enforce its disability benefit plan, New York could not regulate the 
contents of ERISA covered plans. [d. at 109. 
The Court also held "that New York's Human Rights Law is not preempted 
with respect to ERISA benefit plans only insofar as it prohibits practices that 
were lawful under federal law .... " [d. at 108. 
133. Greater Washington, 113 S. Ct. at 583 (quoting Shaw, 463 U.S. at 108). 
134. Greater Washington Bd. of Trade v. District of Columbia, 948 F.2d 1317 
(D.C. Cir. 1991). . 
135. Greater Washington, 113 S. Ct. at 583. 
136. Greater Washington, 113 S. Ct. at 580. 
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Second Circuit's decision in R.R. Donnelly & Sons Co. v. 
Prevost .137 In R.R. Donnelly, the Second Circuit "upheld against a 
preemption challenge a Connecticut law substantially similar to 
[section] 2(c)(2)."138 
2. «Relate[s] to" an ERISA Plan: Exempted from Preemption 
In the Greater Washington, the United States Supreme Court 
restated an earlier conclusion that a law "related to" an ERISA 
covered employee benefit plan for purposes of section 1144(a), "ifit 
has a connection with or reference to such a plan."139 The Court 
also noted that such a law is preempted by ERISA if it is not 
exempted by section 1003(b)(3). Finally, the Court stated the law 
is still preempted even if the effect was not intended, was indirect, 
or was consistent with ERISA requirements. 140 The Court then 
held that "section 2(c)(2) of the Equity Amendment Act specifically 
137. 915 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 947 (1991). 
138. Greater Washington, 113 S. Ct. at 583. 
139. Id. (citing Shaw, 463 U.S. at 97; Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 
U.S. 133, 138 (1990); Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 
825, 829 (1988)). 
140. Id. at 583. The court stated specifically that: 
Under [Section] 514(a), ERISA preempts any state law that refers 
to or has a connection with covered benefit plans (and that does not fall 
within a § 514(b) exception) "even if the law is not specifically designed 
to affect such plans, or the affect is only indirect," Ingersoll-Rand, [ ] 498 . 
U.S. at 139, ... and even if the law is "consistent with ERISA's 
substantive requirements." 
Id. (citing Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 739). In a footnote, the Court observed 
that [p]reemption does not occur, however, if state law has only a "tenuous, 
remote, peripheral" connection with covered plans, as is the case with many laws 
of general applicability. Id. at 583 n.1 (quoting Shaw, 463 U.s. at 100 n. 21) . . 
Other lower federal courts have noted that the exercise of traditional state 
authority is among the criteria to be considered by courts in deciding whether a 
state law is "remote, tenuous, and peripheral." Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. 
Neusser, 810 F.2d 550, 553 (6th Cir. 1987); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Borges, 869 
F.2d 142, 146 (2nd Cir. 1989). In Neusser, the Sixth Circuit provided a list of 
factors to be considered in deciding whether state law falls within the "remote 
and tenuous" exception to section 1144. Neusser, 810 F.2d at 555. These factors 
include: (1) whether the state law represents a traditional exercise of state 
authority; (2) whether the benefit plan affects relations among employer, plan, 
fiduciaries and beneficiaries rather than relations between one of these entities 
and an outside party or between two outside parties, and (3) whether law's effect . 
on ERISA plan is incidental. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Neusser, 810 F.2d 
at 555-56. In Borges, the court of appeals noted that indirect economic impact 
did constitute incidental impact and that any effect on structure, administration, 
and contents of these plans is not incidental. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Borges, 869 
l' 
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refers to welfare benefit plans regulated by ERISA and, on that 
basis alone, is preempted."141 The Court reasoned that health 
care coverage required by section 2(c)(2) "is measured by reference 
to 'existing health insurance coverage' provided by the employer 
and "shall be at the same benefit level."142 The Court found that 
an "employee's existing health care coverage143 .. . is a welfare 
benefit plan ... ," that "employer-sponsored health insurance pro-
grams are subject to ERISA regulation," and that "any state law 
imposing requirements by reference to covered plans must yield to 
ERISA" 
Section 2(c)(2) of the Equity Amendment Act was not saved 
from preemption by the exception granted under section 
1003(b)(3)144 of ERISA for state worker's compensation.145 The 
Court stated that this statutory exception did not restrict section 
1144(a) once it is found that state regulation "relate[s] to" an 
ERISA covered plan.146 The Court also stated that section 2(c)(2) 
did not relate directly to a statutorily exempted welfare benefit 
plan, i.e., workers' compensation, and was not "maintained solely 
for the purpose of complying with" state law exempted by section 
1003(b)(3) of ERISA147 
In holding that section 2(c)(2) of the Equity Amendment Act 
was exempted from preemption, the District Court relied on Shaw 
v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. 148 The Supreme Court did not find the 
District Court's reasoning persuasive. In Shaw, the Court held 
that a New York disability insurance law was exempted under 
section 1003(b)(3) and thus was not preempted by ERISA149 Fur-
thermore, the Court found that the disability law did not "relate 
to" an ERISA covered plan because it was administered through a 
F.2d at 146; see also, Rebaldo v. Cuomo, 749 F.2d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. 
denied, 472 U.S. 1008 (1985). 
141. Greater Washington, 113 S. Ct. at 583. 
142. Id. at 583-84 (quoting D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 36-307(a-1)(1) & (3) (Supp. 
1992)). 
143. Id. at 584. 
144. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(3) (1988 & Supp. III 1991). 
145. Greater Washington, at 584-85. 
146. Id. at 584 (citing Alessi v. Raybestos-Mahattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 525 
(1981) · ("it is of no moment that New Jersey intrudes indirectly through a 
workers' compensation law, rather than directly, through a statute called 
'pension regulation.' ")). 
147. Greater Washington, 113 S. Ct. at 584. 
148. 436 U.S. ·85, 94-95 (1983). 
149. Shaw, 463 U.s. at 108. 
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multibenefit ERISA plan.150 Based on this holding, the Greater 
Washington Court concluded that Shaw could not support the 
District Court's argument that . section 2(c)(2) was exempted by 
section 1003(b)(3) of ERISA.151 The Court emphatically stated 
that once state law "relate[sl to" an ERISA covered plan, it is not 
automatically saved by exemption under section 1003(b)(3), even 
though it could be administered as a separate, non-ERISA plan 
under section 1003(b)(3).152 Greater Washington is most explicit: 
if state continuation of health care coverage regulations "relate[sl 
to" an ERISA covered plan, it is not saved by exemption from pre-
emption under section 1003(b)(3) of ERISA because it is adminis-
tered under a workers' compensation plan. Thus any state health 
care law which would extend coverage to an uninsured who would 
be gainfully employed but for an accident in the course of employ-
ment, would be invalidated by an expansive interpretation of 
ERISA's preemption clause. 
C. Mandated-Benefits Regulation: Not Preempted 
Although the interpretation of ERISA's preemption clause 
has been expansive, the clause does not preempt all health care 
policy that "relate[sl to" ERISA-covered plans. For example, 
states establish and implement health care policy through insur-
ance regulations which mandate health care benefits, such as 
mental health, drug and alcohol abuse, and disability, under 
group health care insurance contracts.153 The Court per;mitted 
states to indirectly regulate employee benefit plans in Metropoli-
tan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts .154 
1. Metropolitan Life 
In Metropolitan Life, the Court addressed Massachusetts 
General Statute chapter 175, section 47B,155 which "requires that 
specified minimum mental-health-care benefits be provided [tol a 
150. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 107; see supra note 80-85 . . 
151. Greater Washington, 113 S. Ct. at 584. . 
152. [d. 
153. Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 746-47. 
154. 471 U.S. 724 (1985). 
155. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, § 47B (West Supp. 1985) (hereinafter 
Section 47B). The commonwealth required that, 
[d. 
any general health-insurance policy that provides hospital and surgical 
coverage, or any benefit plan that has such coverage, to provide as well a 
certain minimum of mental health protection. 
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Massachusetts resident who is insured under a general insurance 
policy, an accident or sickness insurance policy, or an employee 
health-care plan that covers hospital and surgical expenses."156 
The purpose of section 4 7:a was to address "problems encountered 
in treating mental illness" by providing more effective t reatment 
in the private community.157 
In Metropolitan Life, the Court concluded that Section 47B 
was a mandated-benefit statute "that regulate[s] the substantive 
contents of health-insurance policies to further state health care 
policy."158 The Court observed that mandated-benefit statutes, 
regulating the terms of insurance contracts, were quite common 
among the states.159 Moreover, the Court observed that states 
had long regulated insurance contracts.160 In addition, the Court 
observed "that the McCarran-Ferguson Act,161 also strongly sup-
ports the conclusion that regulation regarding the substantive 
156. Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 727. 
157. [d. at 730-31. 
158. [d. at 729. 
159. [d. at 728-29. 
160. [d. at 727~30 n.2-10, 742 n.18-19. 
161. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). The McCarran-Ferguson 
Act was a legislative response to United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters 
Assn., 322 U.S. 533 (1944), in which the Court held that insurance was interstate 
commerce and subject to antitrust law. See United States Dep't of Treasury v. 
Fabe, 113 S. Ct. 2202, 2207 (1993) (Ohio law to liquidate insurance is, in part, 
"regulating the business of insurance. "). 
In Metropolitan Life, the Court stated that "federal law should not be 
construed to supersede state ' laws 'regulating the business of insurance.' '' 
Metropolitan Life , 471 U.S. at 736. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b». The Court also 
observed that the McCarran-Ferguson Act "ensure[s] that the States would 
continue to have the ability to tax and regulate the business of insurance." [d. at 
744 (citing Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co. , 440 U.S. 205, 217-18 
(1979)b. See also Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pierno, 458 U.S. 119 (1982) (three 
prong test to determine what constitutes the business of insurance); SEC v. 
National Sec. Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969) (emphasis on the relationship between 
insurers and insured). Based upon the similarity in the language of McCarran-
Ferguson Act and the saving clause, the Court concluded that the saving clause 
was designed to preserve the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Metropolitan Life, 471 
U.S. at 744. 
The Court also noted that McCarran-Ferguson Act had been interpreted in 
other cases to mean that the regulation of the substantive terms of insurance 
contracts is "regulating the business of insurance." [d. at 742-43. These cases 
have established three criteria to determine whether a practice or activity falls 
within the "business of insurance." .The Court stated that: 
[F]irst, whether the practice has the effect of transferring or spreading a 
policyholder's risk, second, whether the practice is an integral part of 
31
Holloway: ERISA, Preemption and Comprehensive Federal Health Care: A Call f
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1994
436 CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:405 
terms of insurance contracts falls squarely within the saving 
clause (exempted from preemption) as laws "which regulate insur-
ance."162 The Court found that even though mandated-benefit 
statutes required insured employers to provide minimum level 
and kinds of benefits, they were nevertheless regulation of the 
business of insurance.163 The Court then found that Section 47B 
was a mandated-benefit law and thus a regulation of the business 
of insurance. 164 However, it agreed with the Massachusetts Judi-
cial Court that the Massachusetts statute "as applied relates to 
ERISA plans and thus is covered by ERISA's broad preemption 
provision set forth in [section] 1144(a)."165 
2. "Relate{s} to" an ERISA Plan: Exempted from Preemption 
In Metropolitan Life, the Court noted that the preemption 
clause in section 1144(a) is limited by the insurance saving clause, 
the policy relationship between the insurer and the insured; and third, 
whether the practice is limited to entities with the insurance industry. 
ld. at 743 (citing Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pierno, 458 U.S. 119, 129 (1982)). 
The Court then applied the three criteria to section 47B and concluded that 
mandated-benefit laws are state regulation of the "business of insurance." ld. at 
757. 
162. Metropolitan Life , 417 U.S. at 742-43. 
163. ld. at 743. In Metropolitan Life, defendants-appellants Metropolitan Life 
Insurance Co. and Travelers Insurance Company (Travelers) issued group health 
policies to employers who employed .... Massachusetts residents. Under section 47B 
appellants were required to provide mental health benefits under policies issued 
to cover Massachusetts residents. However, believing they were not bound by 
section 47B, the appellants did not provide such benefits. The Attorney General 
sought enforcement of Section 47B by 'declaratory and injunctive relief. In 
granting the injunction, the superior court stated that the appellants refused to 
provide the benefits because they believed that section 47B was preempted by 
ERISA. ld. at 734-35. 
On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed. Attorney 
General v. Travelers Ins. Co., 433 N.E.2d 1223 (Mass. 1982). The Court agreed 
that section 47B relates to .an ERISA covered employee benefit plan. 
Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 739. It then considered whether the insurance 
exemption under section 1144(b)(2)(A) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A), 
would exempt section 47B from preemption. The Court concluded that section 
47B is saved from preemption by section 1144(b)(2)(A) which exempts insurance 
contracts from preemption. ld. at 745-46. The Court held that "Massachusetts' 
mandated-benefit law is a 'law which regulates insurance' and so is not 
preempted by ERISA as it applies to insurance contracts purchased for plans 
subject to ERISA." ld. at 758. 
164. Metropolitan Life, 417 U.S. at 742-43. 
165. ld. at 739. 
1994] 
section 
166. 29 
167. 
168. ld. 
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section 1144(b)(2)(A),166 which "preserves any state law which 
regulates insurance."167 The Court concluded that the Massachu-
setts statute, requiring mandated-mental health benefits, was 
exempted from pre-emption by the insurance saving clause. 168 
The Court reached its conclusion based on its interpretation of the 
language of the saving clause.169 The Court found that the lan-
guage of section 1144(a) was inconsistent with the language of sec-
tion 1144(b)(2)(A) in that section 1144(a) preempts state law, but 
section 1144(b)(2)(A) permits states to make insurance law. It 
then accepted the assumption "that the ordinary meaning of that 
language accurately expresses the legislative purpose."170 The 
Court then concluded that the "plain language of the saving 
clause, its relationship to the other ERISA pre-emption provi-
sions, and the traditional understanding of insurance regulation" 
lead to one conclusion: section 1144(b)(2)(B), the deemer clause, 
exempts from the saving clause state insurance law that indi-
rectly regulates welfare benefit plans. l71 Stated another way, the 
Court concluded that Congress intended to exempt insurance law 
that did not directly regulate employee benefit plans.172 Thus, the 
saving clause exempts traditional state regulation of insurance 
166. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1988 & Supp. III 1991). 
167. Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 742-43. 
168. [d. at 746. 
169. [d. at 744 . 
170. [d. at 740. 
171. [d. at 744-45 . 
172. [d. at 741; see also Michigan United Food & Commercial Workers Union 
v. Baerwaldt, 767 F.2d 308 (6th Cir.1985) (does not preempt state insurance 
regulation requiring substance abuse treatment); Maryland v. Metropolitan Life 
Ins. Co., 463 A.2d 793 (Md. 1983) (does not preempt state insurance regulation 
that requires reimbursement of social worker services); Blue Cross Hosp. Serv., 
Inc. v. Frappier, 698 S.W.2d 326 (Mo. 1985) (does not preempt state insurance 
regulation that mandates chiropractic and psychological services). But see, e.g., 
Insurance Bd. Under Social Ins. Plan of Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Muir, 819 F.2d 
408 (3d Cir. 1987) (preempts state laws that regulate contents of employee 
health care benefit plans); Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Peacock's Apothecary, 
Inc., 567 F. Supp. 1258 (N.D. Ala. 1983) (preempts state law that regulates 
reimbursement for prescription drugs); Council of Hawaii Hotels v. Agsalud, 594 
F. Supp. 449 (D. Haw. 1984) (preempts 1978 amendments to Hawaii Prepaid 
Health Care Act of 1974 that regulates collectively bargained employee health 
care benefit plans); Wayne Chern. Inc. v. Columbus Agency Servo Corp., 426 F. 
Supp. 316 (N.D. Ind. 197'1), modified on other grounds, 567 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 
1978) (preempts state insurance law that prohibits the termination of dependent 
coverage under employee benefit plan); General Split Corp. V. Mitchell, 523 F. 
Supp. 427 (W.D. Wis. 1981) (preempts state law that mandates conversion 
33
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that does not regulate employee benefit plans, though it "relate[s] 
to" ERISA-covered plans. 173 
The Court noted that its decision did not apply to uninsured 
or self-funded welfare benefit plans. 174 As a result, the Massachu-
setts statute affects only employee benefit plans that are covered 
or insured by commercial insurance contracts. ERISA does not, 
under section 1144(a) and its exemptions, permit direct regulation 
of employee benefit plans by states. 175 However it allows indirect 
regulation when it is imposed under an insurance regulation that 
does not mandate the contents of employee benefit plans. 176 Man-
dated-benefit regulation is actually voluntary in that employers 
are not required to purchase group health insurance. In sum, 
after Greater Washington and Metropolitan Life, it is well settled 
that ERISA invalidates much state health care policy that 
"relate[s] to any employee benefit plans," and leaves few regula-
tory means for states to implement effective health care policy.l77 
IV. ERISA, FEDERALISM, AND HEALTH CARE POLICY 
Section 1144(a) is highly restrictive of state health care law 
and public policy, except for narrowly drawn exemptions provided 
in sections 1144(b) and 1003(b)(3). Greater Washington, Metropol-
itan Life and Shaw clearly show that ERISA implements federal 
employment and labor policies mostly for administrative pur-
poses. Ironically, these policies preempt much state health care 
law and public policy, and:thus constitutionally affect the exercise 
of state powers under the federal system.178 However, the worst 
may be yet too come. 
benefits and establishes risk-sharing plans). Ford, supra note 37, discusses 
mandated-benefit statutes enacted by the states after the enactment of ERISA. 
173. Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 745-46. The Court found that Congress 
intended for the states to regulate the business of insurance. Id. at 736-37; 
supra note 158-165 and accompanying text. 
174. Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 747. See generally Jonathan Goldstein, 
Note, ERISA's Deemer Clause and the Question of Self-Insureds: What's a State 
To Do? 67 WASH. u. L.Q. 291, 291-303 (1989). 
175. Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 747. 
176. Id. 
177. See generally supra notes 109, 172, and accompanying text (discussing the 
statutory exemption that Congress granted the Hawaii Prepaid Health Care 
Program (hereinafter Hawaii Prepaid Program». The Hawaii Prepaid Program 
had been preempted by the section 1144(a) of ERISA. 
178. ERISA preemption frustrates the financing of state health care reforms in 
that states cannot shift the cost of health care to employers unless they deCide to 
purchase group health care insurance. Still states can only affect those 
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ERISA is a legislative scheme that demonstrates the need for 
uniformity and consistency in implementing a comprehensive, fed-
eral regulatory framework for certain fields of law, namely 
employment and labor, that were once gove:med by state common 
law and public policy. Eventually, federal health care policy could 
be as comprehensive. Such a policy could require uniformity and 
<;!onsistency in implementing it among the fifty states and thus 
require the preemption of much state health care law and public 
policy.179 Although it furthers a significant public interest, fed-
eral health care regulation still raises substantial concerns that 
are worth considering in regard to its ultimate effect on the scope 
of federalism. 
A. ERISA and Its Impact on State Health Care Policy 
Section 1144(a) of ERISA limits state health care policy even 
though sections 1003(b)(3) and 1144(b)(2)(A) grant exemptions 
from preemption. Those exemptions do not give states the flexibil-
ity to broadly formulate health care policy for their citizens, 
.unless Congress grants an explicit exemption for each state's pro-
gram.180 For example, states cannot mandate the continuation of 
health care coverage in conjunction with employee absences cre-
ated by their receiving workers' compensation, disability benefits, 
or family leave. 181 Therefore, states are severely restricted in 
designing health care regulation to increase access to and pay for 
health care for unemployed, uninsured individuals. 
employers who can afford to and do purchase groups health insurance. The self-
funded employers are out of reach. Under the Court's holding in Metropolitan 
Lile, mandated-benefit statutes do not apply to self-funded or uninsured 
employers. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 471 U.S. at 747. As previously stated, 
section 1144(a) preempts taxes on employee benefit plans, supra note 105, and 
surcharges and fees on commercial insurers, supra notes 112-24. Furthermore, 
section 1144(a) flatly prohibits employer-sponsored benefits and thus states must 
rely on incentives to induce employer participation in state health care plans. 
Boblinski, supra note 1, at 335. It is believed that voluntary health care 
programs are not effective. Id. at 337. 
The financing of any state reforms could be totally preempted if the federal 
government mandates new taxes or fees to finance a national health care 
program. Therefore, any state health care reform must be closely coordinated 
with, governed by federal guidelines, and financed by the federal government or 
exceptions it grants. Infra notes 212, 222, and accompanying text. 
179. See Boblinski, supra note 1, at 345. 
180. Supra notes 99-111 and accompanying text. 
181. See Greater Washington, 113 S. Ct. at 584-85 . 
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1. Expansive Interpretations Impose Severe Limits on State 
Health Care Policy 
In Greater Washington, the Court made it quite clear that if 
state law "relate[s] to" ERISA-covered welfare benefit plans, it is 
preempted, even though it is exempted under section 
1003(b)(3).182 The Court found that the continuation of health 
care coverage is a too-direct regulation of ERISA-covered plans, 
even though this coverage made sure that health care coverage 
was accessible to workers who may not easily qualify for or imme-
diately find employment with health care coverage.183 Although 
the continuation of health care coverage maintains access to 
health care insurance, the Court was not compelled to create an 
exception to ERISA. 
Earlier, in Metropolitan Life , the Court permitted indirect 
regulation of employee benefit plans through mandated-benefits 
imposed under group health care insurance contracts.184 The 
Court did not allow the states to affect the contents of or mandate 
employee benefit plans. 185 Even mandated-benefits regulation 
must stay within the limits of the saving clause, section 
1144(b)(2)(A), and if this regulation is found to be an ERISA-cov-
ered plan, it is preempted under the dee mer clause of section 
1144(b)(2)(B).186 Furthermore, mandated-benefit regulation does 
182. Greater Washington, 113 S. Ct. at 584-85. 
183. [d. at 587-88 (Stevens7'J., dissenting). In arguing that the Court ignored 
the purpose of District of Columbia's continuation coverage and over-interpreted 
the "relate to" language, the dissent maintained: 
The statute at issue in this case does not regulate any ERISA plan 
or require any ERISA plan administrator to make any changes in the 
administration of such a plan .... Moreover, by requiring an injured 
worker's compensation to reflect his entire pay package, the statute 
attempts to replace fully the lost earning power of every injured 
employee. 
[d. at 587 (Stevens, J ., dissenting). The dissent believed that the Court applied a 
mechanical test and never really considered the disfavor of preempting state law 
and the specific concerns of Congress. [d. at 588. 
184. Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 747. 
185. [d. 
186. See, e.g., Wadsworth v. Whaland, 562 F.2d 70 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 
435 U.S. 980 (1978) (state law cannot subject employee benefit plan to state 
insurance regulation or make this plan insurance); St. Paul Elec. Workers 
Welfare Fund v. Markman, 490 F. Supp. 931 (D. Minn. 1980) (state 
comprehensive health care act "relates to" employee welfare benefit plans). 
The interpretation of the deemer clause by federal courts has resulted in 
much praise and criticism. See, e.g. , J .K. Swedback, Note, The Deemer Clause: A 
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not apply to self-funded insurance plans.187 However, even 
though the Court permitted states to enact insurance regulation 
to implement health care policy, it held such regulation shall not 
regulate the contents of employee benefit plans or apply to self-
Legislative Savior for Self-Funded Health Insurance Plans Under the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 18 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 757 (1992); 
Goldstein, supra note 174 (analyzing Reilly v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield United 
of Wis., 846 F.2d 416 (7th Cir. 1988), in which the court of appeals held that "the 
deemer clause of ERISA preempts state law claims against self-insured employee 
benefit plans."). 
187. Federal courts have held that 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) preempts state common 
law and insurance regulation that applies to self-funded plans. See, e.g. , 
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. , 471 U.S. at 738 (decision does not apply to self-funded 
plans); FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52 (1990) (preempts state insurance law 
that regulates self-insured welfare benefit plan); Reilly v. Blue Cross & Blue 
Shield United of Wis., 846 F.2d 416 (7th Cir. 1988) (preempts state law that 
allow claims against self-funded plans); United Food & Commercial Workers & 
Employers Ariz. Health & Welfare Trust v. Paeyza, 801 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1986) 
(preempts state insurance law that establishes reimbursement requirements for 
self-funded plan); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Barnes, 425 F. Supp. 1294 (N.D. Cal. 
1977), aff'd, 571 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 831 (1978) 
(preempts state comprehensive health plan that relates to employee benefit 
plans); Cuttle v. Federal Employees Metal Trades Council, 623 F. Supp. 1154 (D. 
Me. 1985) (preempts state insurance conversion law that might apply to self 
funded plans). 
The protection that ERISA gives to self-funded plans may be short lived. 
The Health Security Proposal, supra note 5, imposes stringent requirements on 
self-funded health care benefit plans. President's Health Plan, supra note 5, at 
79-80. The Health Security Proposal sets "financial reserve requirements for 
self-funded health benefit plans." President's Health Plan, supra note 5, at 79. 
These requirements are as follows: 
New requirements for financial reserves apply to self-funded health 
plans. Self-funded health plans establish a trust fund that is 
maintained at a level equal to estimated amount that the plan owes 
providers at any given time. The plan pays claims from the trust fund. 
Trust funds are protected by special status in bankruptcy proceedings if 
the sponsoring employer fails. 
Reserve requirements may be met through letters of credit, bonds or 
other appropriate security rather than establishing the trust fund . 
A new national guaranty fund for self-funded health plans provides 
financial protection for health providers in case of financial failure of a 
plan. The Department of Labor oversees the national quaranty fund; it 
operates in a manner similar to state insurance guaranty funds. 
The Department of Labor may inspect the books and records of self-
funded health plans and assume control over plans if they fail to meet 
reserve requirements. Health benefit plans notify the Department of 
Labor if they fail to meet requirements. 
President's Health Plan, supra note 5, at 79-80. 
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funded employee benefit plans. 188 Under the Court's holdings in 
Greater Washington and Metropolitan Life, not much state health 
care law and public policy will actually survive challenges under 
section 1144(a). 
B. ERISA and a Reduction in States' Rights 
Preemption is compelled when it is explicit in the language of 
the statute. 189 As ERISA expressly preempts state law, state 
health care policy must give way to federal employment and labor 
regulation. But labor and employment regulation have not tradi-
tionally governed medical 'care and assistance. As a part of this 
regulation, ERISA establishes a uniform and consistent regula-
tory framework for the administration of employee benefit plans, 
not for the regulation of medical care. The employment purpose is 
valid, but its effect on medical care is either too political or too 
legal. 
1. States' Dependency on Federal and Private Interests 
Permitting ERISA to affect uniformity in health care policy 
among the states exceeds the bounds of cooperative government 
relations. Rather than permitting the interaction of the labor 
market and state public policy to set a minimum standard of 
health care benefits, ERISA retains an employer's common law 
discretion to withhold health care benefits. ERISA decreases the 
influence that state public--' policy has on local employees and 
188. Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 738. 
189. [d. at 738. The Court has made it abundantly clear that: 
In deciding whether a federal law pre-empts a state statute, our task is 
to ascertain Congress' intent in enacting the federal statute at issue. 
"Pre-emption may be either expressed or implied, and is compelled 
whether Congress' command is explicitly stated in the statute's 
language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose .... " 
[d. In addition, the Court has other more settled principles that should be 
considered in deciding whether state law and public policy is preempted: 
Consideration of issues arising under the Supremacy Clause "start[s] 
with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States [are] 
not to be superseded by ... Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and 
manifest purpose of Congress. Accordingly, "'[t]he purpose of Congress 
is the ultimate touchstone" , of pre-emption analysis. 
Greater Washington, 113 S. Ct. at 587 n.4 (Stevens, J ., dissenting) (quoting Rice 
v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); Malone v. White Motor 
Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978); Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96,103 
(1963)). Nevertheless, ERISA invalidates much state public policy, legislation, 
and common law. 
1994] 
195. 
196. 
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employee-related decisions. Consequently, the labor market that 
is influenced by global competition is the primary, or at least the 
most significant, determinant of local health care needs and serv-
ices. Under the Court's interpretation of ERISA, local communi-
ties are more likely, when compared with the past, to lose health 
care benefits first and jobs second as the result of the diminished 
influence of local public policy. According to this interpretation, 
ERISA severely restricts the implementation of a flexible, compre-
hensive state health care policy. Matters are made worse by fed-
eral legislative reticence on health care reform. 
Unlike the federal government, states have reformed health 
care. For example, state health care reform consists of federally 
subsidized Medicaid,190 state-sponsored health insurance,191 and 
mandated-benefits of insurance contracts.192 Still, many states 
find themselves in a precarious position when they implement 
their programs. Existing state health care policy that furthers 
legitimate health care needs depends mostly on voluntary gratui-
ties by employers and federal subsidies. 193 State health care 
reform depends on the following factors: (1) whether employers 
will voluntarily grant health care benefits under self-funded 
plans;194 (2) whether employers will voluntarily purchase com-
mercial insurance subject to mandated-benefits regulation;195 
(3) whether the federal government will grant an exemption from 
or exception to section 1144(a);196 and (4) whether the federal gov-
ernment will continue to subsidize medical care and assistance 
190. See generally Robinson, supra note 108, at 977-1013 (extending health 
care to Oregon citizens under federally subsidized Medicaid, voluntarily granted 
employer mandated-benefits, and state-sponsored insurance); supra notes 28-32, 
108, and accompanying text. 
191. Robinson, supra note 108, at 977-1013. 
192. Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 729-31. 
193. See Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 729-31; 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(3) 
(exceptions for worker's compensation and disability benefit laws). In 
Metropolitan Life, the Court noted Massachusetts' rationale and purposes for 
implementing a mandated-benefit statute requiring that mental health benefits 
be given in group health insurance policies. Id. 
194. See Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 747; supra notes 109, 172, and 
accompanying text. 
195. See Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 746-47; supra note 178 and 
accompanying text. 
196. See Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 742-47; supra note 14 and 
accompanying text. 
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programs.197 Employers' gratuities and federal subsidies do not 
fall within the "reserved powers" of the states and thus states lack 
the power to enforce most health care regulation. State financing 
must be taken from already recession-weakened and deficit-laden 
coffers. Therefore, state health care policy is precariously depen-
dent on the whims of deficit-ridden federal and cost-conscious pri-
vate interests that are not within the control of the states' public 
policy mechanisms. 
2. Raising More Fundamental Constitution Concerns 
The ERISA preemption clause raises other more fundamental 
issues, namely the existing scope of federalism under the United 
States Constitution. Much debate has been raised regarding the 
preemptive effects of ERISA on state law (other than insurance 
regulation) that mandates the contents of employee welfare bene-
fit plans.198 ERISA eliminates substantive protection for employ-
ees who were once protected under state common law and public 
policy.199 The lack of protection for employee interests is exacer-
bated by the states' inability to intervene in employer decisions to 
unilaterally terminate or modify health care and other benefits. 
In enacting ERISA, Congress, relying on the Commerce200 and 
197. See Robinson, supra note 108, at 977-1013 (extending health care to 
Oregon citizens under federally subsidized Medicaid); supra notes 28-32, 108, 
and accompanying text. 
198. See, e.g., Laura J. Bond, Note, ERISA-Preemption-Pilot Life Insurance 
Co. v. Dedeaux: Congress's Cue to Reassess ERISA's Preemptive Effect, 36 KAN. 
L. REV. 611 (1988); Robert I. Lorio, Note, Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon: State 
Actions for Wrongful Employment Discharge Subject to ERISA Preemption, 37 
Loy. L. REV. 375 (1991); Boblinski, supra note 1; David L. Gregory, The Scope of 
ERISA Preemption of State Law: A Study on Effective Federalism, 48 U. PI'IT. L. 
REV. 427 (1987); James D. Hutchinson & David M. Ifshin, Federal Preemption of 
State Law Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 46 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 23 (1978); Peter H. Turza & Lorraine Hollaway, Preemption of State 
Laws Under the Employee Retirement Income Act of 1974,28 CAUl. U. L. REV. 
163, 169-74 (1974); Ackerman, supra note 7, at 825. 
199. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988 & Supp. 1991); supra notes 48-57 and 
accompanying text. ERISA also requires federal courts to develop federal 
common law contract and trust to construe employee benefit plans. Firestone 
Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110-12 (1989) (citing, Pilot Life Ins. 
Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987); see also, Franchise Tax Bd. v. 
Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 24 n.26 (1983). "A body of 
Federal substantive law will be developed by the courts to deal with issues 
involving rights and obligations under private welfare and pension plans." Id. at 
24 n.26 (quoting, 129 Congo Rec. 29942 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Javits». 
200. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
203. 
204. 
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Supremacy Clauses,201 sought and established uniformity and 
consistency in employee benefit policies. Congress did not intend 
to affect States' abilities to formulate local public policy or to 
strengthen states' rights for employee benefits, notwithstanding 
the explicit reservation of power under the Tenth Amendment of 
the Constitution.202 
V. LESSER FEDERALISM OR MORE FEDERAL MEDICAL CARE 
To lessen the preemption of state health care policy and to 
preserve states' rights to affect public policy, amending the ERISA 
preemption clause is not the answer. Amending the preemption 
clause will not entirely eliminate federal-state conflict regarding 
the preemption of state health care law and public policy. This is 
because federal policy-makers may preempt even more state 
health care and other law and public policy by establishing a com-
prehensive national health care program.203 A comprehensive 
national health care policy would have to deal with interrelated 
social, economic, and political issues in order to address essential 
health care and health care related standards. Namely, such a 
policy would need to accomplish several or all of the following 
goals: (1) make health care more accessible; (2) reduce or limit 
health care costs; (3) provide medical malpractice reform; (4) elim-
inate duplicate state health care and health-care related pro-
grams; and (5) pay for the increased use of health care services.204 
A comprehensive federal health care legislation that establishes a 
201. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
202. U.S. CONST. art. VI; see generally Gregory, supra note 34, at 429; 
Boblinski, supra note 1, at 258 (discussing ERISA's impact on federalism under 
the labor preemption doctrine). In Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. Agsalud, 442 F . 
Supp. 695 (1977), the district court stated that: "By preempting state health 
insurance laws, Congress did not violate the limits placed by the Tenth 
Amendment on its authority under the Commerce Clause." Id. at 710. Relying 
on the National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), the district court 
concluded that ERISA regulates business affairs, namely employment 
relationships and "does not impair any essential attribute of state soverei.gnty." 
Agsalud, 442 F. Supp. at 710. For comments on whether federalism has political 
or legal substance under the Constitution, see generally H. Jefferson Powell, The 
Oldest Question of Constitutional Law, 79 VA. L. REV. 633 (1993) (discussing the 
prudential grounds for a rule of law protecting federalism under the U.S. 
Constitution). 
203. See Boblinski, supra note 1, at 344-45. 
204. See, e.g., Boblinski, supra note 1, at 260-68, Ackerman, supra note 7, at 
826-830; President's Health Plan, supra note 5, at 3-4. 
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uniform and consistent policy would potentially preempt more 
state law than ERISA. 
A. Impact of National Health Care Policy 
Why would such a federal law need to be so Draconian? To 
further legitimate federal interests among the states, a compre-
hensive federal health care regulation would eventually preempt 
parts or all of state law and public policy in the following fields: 
(1) hospital and health care institution regulation;205 (2) insur-
205. Health care providers and others . have challenged state hospital 
surcharges, fees, and other regulations under section 1144(a) ·of E~ISA. Supra 
notes 112-24 and accompanying text. In not preempting hospital surcharges, 
ERISA permits states to · shift health care cost to commercial insurers and 
employers. Supra notes 114-26. A federally provided and financed health care 
program would make it difficult for states' citizens, who are required to pay a 
health care tax, to finance additional local and state health care needs. See 
President's Health Plan, supra note 5, at 52. Under the Health Security 
Proposal, "[s]tates can not regulate premium rates changed by health plans, 
except when necessary to meet budget requirements or to ensure plan solvency." 
Id. at 55-56. Although states may provide benefits beyond those required by the 
Health Security Proposal, they can not use revenues from the Health Security 
Proposal to provide additional benefits. Id. at 56. In addition, they cannot "rely 
on a payroll mandate on employers or another revenue source applicable solely to 
corporations or payroll." Id. 
Finally, a comprehensive-federal comprehensive health care proposal, such 
as the Health Security Proposal, would more likely eliminate state hospital 
surcharges and fees that are imposed on patients' bills as these bills would then 
be paid by funds collected and distributed under a national health care program. 
And remaining state fees could be so burdensome that hospital and other 
organizations may not be able to pay them. Furthermore, comprehensive federal 
health care would eventually subject hospitals and other health care institutions 
to more federal regulation, either directly or indirectly. See Ron Winslow, 
Medical Industry Scrambles To Keep Up With Changes , WALL ST. J., Sept. 13, 
1993, at A7. 
Under the Health Security Proposal, supra note 5, the federal government 
will regulate health care institutions in streamlining regulations. For example, 
the Health Security Proposal states that: 
Minimum Standards for Health Care Institutions. The National 
Quality management Program develops uniform standards for licensing 
of health care institutions that focus on essential performance 
requirements related to patient care. As those standards are developed, 
those standards replace current standards ... 
Id. at 118-19. Thus, the Health Security Proposal and similar proposals would 
make existing state regulation and public policy invalid as the federal 
government creates a uniform and consistent health care institution standards. 
19 
Id. 
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ance regulation;206 (3) common law tort, contract, and employ-
ment;207 (4) worker's compensation acts;208 (5) disability benefits 
206. The federal regulation of insurance contracts to increase accessibility to 
health care would necessarily preempt much state insurance statutes and 
common law as insurance is regulated by the state. See Metropolitan Life Ins. 
Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 727-29 (1985). Such preemption could also 
undermine much health care-related benefits that are provided under mandated-
benefit statutes of insurance regulation. See Hofmann & Fletcher, supra note 3, 
at 1 & 45; Fletcher, supra note 3, at 24. 
The Health Security Proposal would drastically change state health 
insurance regulation. Many health insurers would be affected by the Health 
Security Proposal as health insurance as we know it today would be drastically 
scaled back. Winslow, supra note 205, at A7. Health plans, insurers, or any 
other persons may not offer a supplemental insurance policy that duplicates the 
benefits of the comprehensive package. President's Health Plan, supra note 5, at 
89-90. Supplemental insurance can be used to cover both cost sharing and 
additional health benefits. It can cover all or some of benefits not included in the 
comprehensive package. Id. at 88. Not all supplemental policies must abide by 
the rules for insurance; e.g., medigap insurance and insurance against accidents. 
Id. The specifics of the Health Security Proposal provide: 
The National Health Board develops two standard, supplemental 
cost-sharing policies. One model provides standard coverage; the other 
maximum coverage. 
SUPPLEMENTAL INSURANCE 
Supplemental insurance to cover both cost sharing and additional 
health benefits is allowed. 
A supplemental benefit policy may cover all or some portion of 
benefits not included in the comprehensive package, such as long-term 
rehabilitation services and cosmetic surgery. A policy covering cost 
sharing might pay a portion of co-payments and co-insurance required 
by a health plan. 
Any entity that offers supplemental policies must abide by the rules 
for supplemental insurance. However, the following types of insurance 
policies are not subject to these rules: 
* Long-term care insurance 
* Insurance against specific diseases 
* Hospital or nursing home indemnity insurance 
* Medigap insurance 
* Insurance against accidents. 
Id. at 88. In addition, the Health Security Proposal would repeal the antitrust 
exemption given to health insurance companies. This would eliminate the ability 
of the health plan, as insurers, to "collectively determine the rates they charge 
. ... " Id. at 195. In short, there will be a smaller health insurance industry and 
less state authority to regulate it. 
207. As a comprehensive regulatory scheme, ERISA has had, and is still 
having, a broad impact on employer-employee relations, as well as other state 
common law and public policy. In comparison, a comprehensive national health 
care program could have similar effects on the employment and other contractual 
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relationships that arise between the health care delivery system and the public. 
Thus, a comprehensive health care system may be equally as intrusive as 
ERISA. It is reasonable to infer that national health care will affect parts of 
contract (doctor-patient), tort (medical malpractice), and employment (employer-
employee). See Hofmann & Fletcher, supra note 3, at 1 & 45; Fletcher, supra 
note 3, at 24. 
ERISA has preempted much state common law and related public policy to 
maintain a uniform and consistent regulatory scheme for the administration of 
employee benefit plans. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133 (1990) 
(preempts state wrongful discharge claim); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 
U.S. 41 (1987) (preempts state common law fraud in the inducement); 
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor; 481 U.S. 58 (1987) (preempts state common 
law insurance claim). The Court's expansive interpretation of ERISA does not 
permit state tort, contract, or insurance laws "that provide an alternative cause 
of action to employees to collect benefits protected by ERISA .... " AETNA Life 
Ins. Co. v. Borges, 869 F.2d 142, 146 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 811 
(1990); supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text. ERISA's preemption of much 
state common law has generated much scholarly commentary. See supra note 
198 and accompanying text. The Health Security Proposal, supra note 5, shows 
how a comprehensive health care plan could eventually affect state common law 
and public policy. For example, the Health Security Proposal increases employer 
responsibility for employee welfare benefits. It requires the employer to share 
health care costs with the employee. President's Health Plan, supra note 5, at 
17-18. It also requires "[e]mployers whose primary occupation is employee 
leasing ... to participate in regional Health alliances regardless of the number of 
employees." Id. at 21. "The term employer is defined as it is under the ERISA 
statute." Id. Finally, "The Department of Labor regulates employers ... " in 
corporate alliances. Id. . at 72. It is entirely unreasonable to expect a 
comprehensive federal. health care plan to have a lesser effect on state common 
law and public policy of employment and other fields of law. 
208. Hofmann & Fletcher, supra note 3, at 1-45; Fletcher, supra note 3, at 24. 
Section 1003(b)(3) of ERISA exempts state worker's compensation acts from 
preemption, but it may not"be the same under a comprehensive federal health 
care program. Commentators, policy analysts, and others are worried about the 
impact of a national health care program on state worker's compensation. 
Hofmann & Fletcher, supra note 3, at 45; Fletcher, supra note 3, at 24. It is 
urged that "coverage for injured workers' medical care," be shifted to a national 
health care program. Id. Some believe that the shift is a foregone conclusion, 
while others have cautioned the current Federal Administration not to forget the 
purpose of workers' compensation: "overall workplace disability management 
system that focuses on maximum medical improvement and prompt return to 
work." Id. Implementing worker's compensation under a comprehensive federal 
health care program requires coordinating- probably through creating uniform 
and consistent workers' compensation laws-federal and state laws. Hofmann & 
Fletcher, supra note 3, 'at 45. This would required the preemption .of state 
workers' compensation law. Fletcher, supra note 3, at 24. 
Commentators and others were not entirely wrong. In actuality, the Health 
Security Proposal, supra note 5, would preempt state workers' compensation law 
regulating the choice of health care "provider for workers' compensation cases of 
44
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law;209 (6) automobile liability insurance law;210 (7) medical mal-
practice law;211 and (8) special exemption from preemption under 
Section 1144.212 Such expansive and massive preemption, 
whether immediate or gradual, means that preemption under a 
individuals covered through health alliances." President Health Plan, supra 
note 5, at 98. However, the Health Security Proposal presently does not preempt 
other workers' compensation regulation. [d. at 99. "Health benefits for work-
related injuries and illness continue to be defined by states." [d. But recognizing 
the existing federal dominance in the field of health care, federal preemption of 
state law and public policy tends to be even more expansive. Federal preemption 
may give the States healthy citizens but perhaps a sick government, preemption 
that causes morbid federalism. 
209. See supra note 208. 
210. See supra note 208; Hofmann & Fletcher, supra note 3, at 1. The Health 
Security Proposal, supra note 5, requires automobile insurers to "reimburse ... 
the health plan for services provided." President's Health Plan, supra note 5, at 
101. The Health Security Proposal does not preempt the much state liability 
insurance other than that insurance law covering the choice of providers. [d. 
211. A federal health care program could become as preemptive as ERISA. To 
maintain uniform and consistent access to health care, many state common law 
claims will be preempted by federal health care regulation, or the federal 
program will become a patch work of uncoordinated state schemes that lack the 
consistency and uniformity intended by the federal scheme. See Boblinski, supra 
note 1, at 345. 
For that reason and others, many health care reformers see a reform of 
medical malpractice law as a part of a national health care program. See 
Woolsey, supra note 1, at 20-25. It is strongly believed that the current Federal 
Administration's proposal Includes provisions for reforming medical malpractice 
laws. These provisions "will discourage frivolous suits and encourage greater use 
of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms." J. Geisel, Employer Mandate Key 
to Financing, Bus. INS., May 17, 1993, at 144. 
That thinking is correct. The Health Security Proposal, supra note 5, does 
attempt to reform medical malpractice. The Health Security Proposal reforms 
medical malpractice law by proposing changes in tort and alternative dispute 
resolution mechanisms. President's Health Plan, supra note 5, at 189. Its 
proposed changes are as follows: (1) creation of alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms, (2) requirement for certificate of merit, (3) limits on attorney fees, 
(4) repeat offenders, (5) collateral services, (6) periodic payment of awards, 
(7) enterprise liability demonstration project, and (8) standards based on practice 
guidelines. [d. at 189-91. Unless states are exempted from the requirements of 
a comprehensive federal health care program, much state common law will be 
preempted as the federal program seeks to maintain uniformity and consistency 
in the exclusive federal scheme. 
212. Supra note 205 and accompanying text. The Health Security Proposal, 
supra note 5, modifies the preemption provision of ERISA. It states that: 
The ERISA preemption provision is modified to: 
*. Apply the preemption only with respect to employers and health 
benefit plans in corporate alliances. 
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comprehensive federal health care regulation would only start 
where ERISA left off. This may explain Congress' reservation in 
not amending ERISA. By not giving the states exemptions from 
and exceptions to preemption for local health care plans,213 Con-
gress avoids repealing ERISA amendments that would be incon-
sistent with highly comprehensive federal health care.214 
1. Broad Preemptive Effects of Comprehensive Health Care 
Comprehensive federal health care would have some broad 
preemptive effects in many fields of regulation. For example, a 
regulation governing the health care insurance industry could 
impliedly, if not expressly, preempt states from uSIng the man-
dated-benefit statute as a voluntary means of establishing access 
to health care benefits for employed, retired, and disabled work-
ers. Obviously, state mandated-benefits that are impose under 
insurance contracts would either be preempted or incorporated 
into the national health care program. In any event, states lose 
some of their authority over the insurance industry by not having 
the power to make broad based mandated-benefit statutes. More-
over, strengthening the ERISA prohibition against employer-
sponsored health care benefits would continue to deny all states, 
except Hawaii,215 ali alternative means to affect local and state 
public policy. But permitting the federal government to impose 
employer-based health care taxes that are not designed specifi-
cally to support health care needs of the local population requires 
local employers to support health care for the general population 
* Permit taxes and assessments . on employers or health benefit 
plans in corporate alliances if the assessments are nondiscriminatory in 
nature. 
* Permit states to develop all-payer hospital rates or all-payer rate ' 
setting. 
* States also may require all payers, including health benefit plans 
in corporate alliances, to reimburse essential community providers. 
President's Health Plan, supra note 5, at 80. Note that the Health Security 
Proposal permits "taxes and assessments employers or health benefit plans in 
corporate alliances." Id. at 80. States can also develop all-payer hospital rates or 
all-payer rate setting. Id. The Health Security Proposal would provide some 
relief for states, but they would still be subject to new federal regulations. 
213. Infra notes 217-20 and accompanying text. ' 
214. It is believed that a national health care program should make it easier 
for states to enact new and maintain health care reforms. See Geisel, supra note 
211, at 44. . 
215. See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
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rather than for local employees and their families. 216 As a result, 
states are denied the ability to redistribute wealth to support local 
economic growth and social progress. Under such a program, 
states will lose the power to affect local public policy. 
A comprehensive national health care policy will be more pre-
emptive than ERISA because in providing a minimum standard 
and some uniformity, it will have to control health care and health 
care-related interests which are intertwined with numerous fields 
of state law and public policy. This will result in the undermining 
of federalism. 
B. Comprehensive Health Care in the Spirit of Federalism 
The time has passed for Congress to relieve states of the pre-
emptive effects of federal labor and employment law on state 
health care policy. At this time, amending ERISA would only con-
fuse sincere federal efforts to design a national health care pro-
gram. 217 Furthermore, any federal health care policy must 
preempt considerable state law or exempt from preemption state 
health care policy that complies with or exceeds minimum federal 
health care standards. The latter alternative considerably pre-
serves federalism by giving the states responsibility for their own 
welfare218 and not enlarging federal health care powers where 
exclusive federal power may not necessarily exist.219 A coordi-
nated state-federal health care policy is the preferred long-term 
216. But see President's Health Plan, supra note 5, at 52-53; supra note 5 and 
accompanying text. To avoid the full scale redistribution of wealth across the 
nation, the Health Security Proposal, supra note 5, establishes a local-national 
arrangement through creating corporate and regional health alliances. States 
establish and govern the regional health alliances. President's Health Plan, 
supra note 5, at 60-80. 
217. Boblinski, supra note 1, at 343-46. 
218. Infra notes 220-22 and accompanying text. States do not necessarily give 
first priority to legitimate social interests when they are unpopular with the 
states' citizens. See Boblinski, supra note 1, at 344-45. 
219. Parmet, supra note 22, at 319-30; Thompson, supra note 22, at 647-48; 
Rivkin, supra note 22, at A19. Expansive preemptive provisions that control 
employer-employee relations, personal injury law, insurance suits, and work-
related claims threaten to create a uniform system of federal common law which 
would supplant much state common law and public policy. This expands the 
interpretive powers of federal courts but leaves them without much state public 
policy. In regard to the making of federal common law, many health care issues 
are broad based social questions that federal courts should not decide, such as 
the duration, frequency, amount, and quality of health care for specific illnesses. 
National health care is a complex, state and federal public policy problem. See 
47
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strategy. In the short-term, as a stop gap measure, a limited 
exemption from preemption under ERISA of federally recognized 
comprehensive state health care programs is suitable. 220 
1. Maintaining ((Cooperative Federalism" In Comprehensive 
Health Care 
Notwithstanding long-running state reluctance to redistrib-
ute wealth and pursue broad social welfare interests,221 if states 
are constantly subjected to federal authority that provides essen-
tial human needs for their citizens, they may lose their faith in 
democracy.222 . Whether Hamiltonian · or Jeffersonian federal-
ism,223 state interests that economically encourage employment in 
communities that permit unhealthy labor do not invest in their 
human resources. These state interests are characteristic of the 
dawn of the industrial age, not the dawn of the information age. 
For that reason, a national health care policy should start with an 
adamant stand by the federal government that the nation will 
Boblinski, supra note 1, at 345-48. It is not precedent for federal courts to tread 
where fools dare not to go. 
220. Boblinski, supra note 1, finds that a comprehensive national health care 
program is the better alternative. Id. at 346. She finds that an ERISA waiver 
would not be entirely effective in that some states may feel that employer-
mandated health care beneE,ts make them less attractive. Furthermore, 
Congress may be reluctant to grant such a waiver. Id. at 344-45. 
221. See Boblinski, supra note 1, at 270-71; Thompson, supra note 22, at 648. 
222. See Boblinski, supra note 1, at 270-71. Many commentators, policy 
analysts, and others argue that "poorer, less industrialized states" may not be 
able to formulate effective health care programs. Kenny & Sullivan, supra note 
1, at 44. They argue that this reason justifies exclusive federal control of health 
care. But it should not. It justifies federal policy and financial assistance. If the 
United States does not reduce the cost of health care, it could be a poor, deficit 
ridden, service state and thus, it could not establis!J. health care for anyone. 
223. Gregory, supra note 34, at 429. Gregory describes the thinking on the 
federal-state relationship during the framing of the Constitution: 
Alexander IJamilton advocated a strong federal government. He feared 
that the forum of national government originally proposed at the 
Convention was not sufficiently powerful and lobbied to broaden its 
authority ... . 
Thomas Jefferson and the anti-Federalist Republicans, on the other 
hand, believed that a powerful national government would inevitably 
lead to an irresponsible, corrupt and expensive bureaucratic 
government. 
Id. at 439. supra 
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have coordinated local-national health care and that states shall 
administer and pay for much of it.224 
2. Governmental Participation In Comprehensive Health 
Care 
Under local-national health care sharing responsibility, the 
federal government should participate with authority, as opposed 
to exclusive control, in establishing minimum health care needs 
and reasonable cost controls for health care services.225 Federal 
participation should not greatly exceed federal-state relations that 
were created in establishing medical services, controlling costs, 
and insuring quality under Medicaid and Medicare. Moreover, 
Medicaid should be fully integrated into a coordinated local-
national health care program. Small and large businesses should 
not be permitted to externalize (to Medicaid and other programs) 
the costs of health care for uninsured, employed, low-income 
workers, and nonworkers if these businesses are subject to 
employer-sponsored health care programs. Most significantly, the 
federal government must provide some funds to provide health 
care for the insurable and uninsured persons. The federal role 
should be to facilitate and coordinate but not exclusively govern 
the health care systems of the states. 
3. The Quintessential Constitutional Concerns 
In local-national health care regulation, states must accept 
and impose greater health care responsibilities on their busi-
nesses, local governments, and citizens. Unfortunately, states 
224. Kenny & Sullivan, supra note 1, at 41 & 44; Keefe, supra note 7, at 40; 
Thompson, supra note 22, at 647-48. Under the Health Security Proposal, it is 
intended that governmental responsibility for the administration of the health 
care system be shared by the federal and state governments. President's Health 
Plan, supra note 5, at 52-53. The Health Security Proposal states that: 
States assume primary responsibility for ensuring that all eligible 
individuals have access to a health plan that delivers the nationally 
guaranteed comprehensive benefit package. 
Id. at 52-53. However, the ' states are generally permitted in limited 
circumstances to levy taxes or assess fees to pay for health care needs of their 
citizens, though the ERISA preemption will be modified. Id. at 80. 
225. Kenny & Sullivan, supra note 1, at 43. Similar components of major 
health care proposals are as follows: "[(1)] [a] uniform benefit packages, 
[(2)] [a]ccountable health care plans that compete at the .local level[, and (3)] 
public sponsorships of individuals and small employers. Id. at 43. The Health 
Security Proposal contains similar components. See President's Health Plan, 
supra note 5, at 3-4. 
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have been reluctant to do this.226. As a starting point, states need 
to make equitable social welfare regulation. Next, they need to 
establish medical services that are equal to or consistent with fed-
erally proposed benefit packages. Finally, they need to establish 
and maintain access to and control of local health care costs. 
Several reasons support states' acceptance of greater health 
care responsibilities. First, states already regulate doctors, 
nurses, hospitals, and insurers.227 Second, ~tates know local 
social and economic conditions and thus can· design health care 
plans to fit local communities, such as municipalities and coun-
ties.228 Third, states have gained conf;liderable fiscal knowledge 
and experience in regulating health care costs under Medicare 
and Medicaid.229 They have also attempted to implement compre-
hensive health care programs. Finally, since states provide much 
of the health care and medical education, they can use their edu-
cation systems to educate their citizens and businesses. In pre-
serving federalism by insuring greater participation and authority 
for states in making health care law and public policy, the quin-
tessential questions are: (1) whether the states are willing to 
accept more responsibility for health care; and (2) whether the 
federal government is willing to give up some of its health care 
authority.230 Presently, neither appears willing to share this 
responsibility and thus federalism falters. 
-. VI. CONCLUSION 
ERISA has a negative impact on state health care law and 
public policy. Its exceptions to coverage and exemptions from pre-
emption do not give the states enough flexibility to design and 
implement state health care reform unless the federal government 
grants prior approval for employer-sponsored benefits or grants 
funds for medical assistance programs. The federal-state relation-
ship regarding state health care policy reflects the almost total 
dependence of the states on federal regulation. This dependence 
signals a decline in federalism. This decline could be accelerated 
by the formulation and eventual implementation of a comprehen-
sive federal health care policy that, when compared with the com-
226. Thompson, supra note 22, at 647-48. 
227. Supra notes 112-24 and accompanying text. 
228. But see Thompson, supra note 22, at 647-48. 
229. See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text. 
230. See Thompson, supra note 22, at 647-48. 
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prehensive regulation of employee benefit plans, could preempt 
more state law and public policy than ERISA. 231 
Despite this decline, federalism can still be strengthened . 
First, the federal government needs to establish a minimum stan-
dard of health care. Second, federal employee benefit policy needs 
to exempt from preemption state health care law and policy under 
certain conditions. When a state comprehensive health care pro-
gram complies with federal cost, access and quality requirements, 
and insures an equitable distribution of medical care among a 
state's citizens, it should be recognized and supported by the fed-
eral government.232 However, in the long-term, state-federal coor-
dination and the sharing of health care responsibilities through a 
local-national health care plan is the ultimate solution.233 Federal 
regulation that preempts (i.e. ignores) local and state public policy 
. furthers the decline of coordinated government needed for "cooper-
ative federalism"234 in a complex, maturing society. Such inept 
constitutional wisdom leads to complex policy problems that even-
tually mature into strategic failures. 
231. Supra notes 217 -20 and accompanying text; see Rivkin, supra note 22, at 
A19. 
232. Supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
233. Keefe, supra note 7, at 44. 
234. Rebaldo v. Cuomo, 749 F.2d 133, 139 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.s. 
1008 (1985) (ERISA does not preempt state law that regulates hospital fees.); 
supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
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